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EXPECTATIONS LOST: BANK OF THE WEST V. SUPERIOR
CouRT4 PLACES THE Fox IN CHARGE OF THE HENHOUSE
JOHN L. ROMAKER* &
VIRGIL B. PRIETO *
That portion of the field of law that is classified and described as the
law of contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that
have been induced by the making of a promise. Doubtless, this is not the
only purpose by which men have been motivated in creating the law of
contracts; but it is believed to be the main underlying purpose, and it is
believed that an understanding of many of the existing rules and a
determination of their effectiveness require a lively consciousness of this
underlying purpose.2
INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court established a benchmark for measuring
insurance coverage when it decided Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.3 For
twenty-five years, the Gray decision controlled insurance coverage disputes.
Gray achieved landmark status by (1) setting the standard for an insurer's
duty to defend' and (2) defining the California law for construing insurance
contracts.' The Traynor Court' determined insurance contracts to be
adhesion contracts.' Therefore, the Court mandated a special set of rules
1. 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992).
* B.A., University of Wisconsin (1980); J.D., Magna Cum Laude, California Western School
of Law (1988); Partner in the law firm of Brown, Guetz, and Romaker; Adjunct Professor of
Insurance Law, California Western School of Law.
** B.A., University of Hawaii (1990); J.D., expected 1993, California Western School of
Law.
2. 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1, at 2 (1963).
3. 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966).
4. See generally Daniel A. Miller, Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray
v. Zurich, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (1967) [hereinafter Duty to Defend Made Absolute]
(suggesting that the Gray decision's effect on insurance practice in California would be an
absolute duty to defend imposed upon insurers).
5. Building upon the foundation laid by Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 377 P.2d
284 (Cal. 1962), the Gray decision legitimized the reasonable expectations doctrine in California
by providing the rules under which the doctrine would operate.
6. Chief Justice Roger Traynor served the California Supreme Court in the capacity of
Associate Justice from 1940-1964 and as Chief Justice from 1964-1970.
7. Gray, 419 P.2d at 171. "The term [adhesion contract] signifies a standardized contract,
which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the
subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." Neal v. State Farm
Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1961).
1
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under which insurance policy coverage disputes would be analyzed. Using
the adhesion contract theory, a substantial number of cases molded,8
modified,9 and subsequently entrenched' ° the reasonable expectations
doctrine" in California jurisprudence. Although the Gray decision drew
intense criticism, 2 it influenced insurance law throughout the country.' 3
Bank of the West v. Superior Court essentially overturned Gray v. Zurich
sub silentio. Although the Lucas Court recognized that insurance contracts
are "special," 4 it decided to treat insurance contracts just like any other
contract. 5 The Court followed in the footsteps of the Iowa and Arizona
8. See Neal, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Ct. App. I Dist. 1961); Steven, 377 P.2d 284 (Cal.
1962); Gray, 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966); Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 456 P.2d
674 (Cal. 1969).
9. See Herzog v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 841 (Cal. 1970) (requirement of ambiguity);
Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exch., 682 P.2d 1100 (Cal. 1984) (exception for "sophisticated insured"
or contracts actually negotiated upon between both parties to an adhesion contract).
10. See Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 482 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1971); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober, 514 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1973); Holz Rubber Co. v. American
Star Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 1055 (Cal. 1975); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., Inc.,
583 P.2d 1335 (Cal. 1978); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1982); Producers
Dairy Delivery Co., Inc. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1986).
11. The reasonable expectations doctrine is discussed in detail infra at parts I.C. and II.
12. See David S. Miller, Comment, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the
Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988); William A. Mayhew, Reasonable
Expectations: Seeking a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267 (1986); Duty to Defend
Made Absolute, supra note 4.
13. Jarvis v. Aetna Casulty & Sur. Co., 633 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1981) (adhesion
contract theory and reasonable expectations doctrine); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Meere, 694
P.2d 181, 187 (Ariz. 1984) (intentional acts exclusion); Hartford Ins. Group v. District Court
for Fourth Judicial Dist., 625 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Colo. 1981) (duty to defend); Missionaries of
Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Casulty & Sur. Co., 230 A.2d 21, 26 (Conn. 1967) (duty to
defend); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., Ltd., 654 P.2d 1345, 1349
(Haw. 1982) (duty to defend); Corgatelli v. Global Life & Accident Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 737
(Idaho 1975) (reasonable expectations doctrine); Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
208 N.W.2d 903, 905-06 (Iowa 1973) (adhesion contract and reasonable expectations doctrine);
Gowing v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 483 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Kan. 1971) (adhesion contract
and reasonable expectations doctrine); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 227
(Me. 1980) (duty to defend); Markline Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Mass.
1981) (adhesion contract and reasonable expectations doctrine); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Rombough,
180 N.W.2d 775, 777, 778 (Mich. 1970) (duty to defend, adhesion contract and reasonable
expectations doctrine); Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277
(reasonable expectations doctrine); McAlear v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 493 P.2d 331, 335 (Mont.
1972) (duty to defend, adhesion contract and reasonable expectations doctrine); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Novak, 313 N.W.2d 636, 640, 641 (Neb. 1981) (intentional acts exclusion and duty to
defend); Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 225 A.2d 328, 332 (N.J. 1966) (reasonable
expectations doctrine); Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 671-72 (N.D.
1977) (adhesion contract and reasonable expectations doctrine); Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Thompson, 491 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ohio 1986) (intentional acts exclusion); Conner v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 770, 773, 774 (Okla. 1972) (duty to defend); State Farrm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Utah 1987) (reasonable expectations
doctrine); Boston Ins. Co. v. Maddux Well Serv., 459 P.2d 777, 779-80 (Wyo. 1967) (duty to
defend).
14. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d at 551.
15. Id. at 551-52 ("[l]nsurance contracts ... are still contracts to which the ordinary rules
of contractual interpretation apply.").
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Supreme Courts16 in forsaking the reasonable expectations doctrine 7 by
following a canon of contract construction similar to the rule embodied in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 211.18 The words "adhesion
contract" were notably absent19 from the opinion, and in a sweep of judicial
legerdemain, a quarter century of Gray and its progeny apparently vanished
to be replaced by the vagaries of California Civil Code section 16491° as the
law that governs construction of insurance policies in coverage disputes. The
insurance industry had won a decisive victory-the reasonable expectations
doctrine is effectively dead. 2' Because the Bank of the West decision strays
16. Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1984);
State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W. 2d 104, 112 (Iowa 1981), later proceeding,
343 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1984). See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 843-46 (1990).
17. In Gray, the California Supreme Court held that in the event of uncertainty or ambiguity
in insurance contract language, the contract will be construed against the insurer in accordance
with the reasonable expectations of the insured. 419 P.2d at 172. The doctrine will be
discussed in more detail infra at parts I.C. and II.
18. Restatement (Second) § 211 relates to "Standardized Agreements" the text of which reads
as follows:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or
otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are
regularly used to embody terms and agreements of the same type, he adopts the
writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike those similarly
situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms
of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the other party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the
term is not part of the agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of Contracts § 211 (1979). Both canons heed traditional contract
interpretation precepts.
19. The absence of the term is noteworthy because the adhesion doctrine has been the basis
for the special rules that governed insurance contract interpretation for twenty five years. See
parts I.C. & II infra.
20. The Code Section is entitled "Ambiguity or uncertainty; promise" and provides in
pertinent part:
If the terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be
interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that
the promisee understood it.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1649 (West 1985).
21. The reasonable expectations doctrine developed as a judicial reaction to the real threat of
overreaching and unconscionable advantage which insurance companies and other large
businesses enjoyed as drafters of standardized contracts which governed the actions of the
contracting parties. See generally Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with
Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970). The doctrine of reasonable expectations, like
the law of implied warranties, is a consumer protection principle which sheltered the individual
bargainer's legitimate expectations by taking account of those expectations when construing the
usual garbled language of the insurance contract. By placing the weight of the contractual
analysis upon the insurer's perceptions at the time of contracting, the California Supreme Court
has dangerously tipped the balance in favor of the insurance industry. See infra part III.
3
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far from rules which governed for a quarter of a century, it is important to
trace the history of insurance contract interpretation through the years.
Part I of this article outlines the history of contract interpretation in the
insurance context. It traces the development of case law pertaining to the
allied principles of contra proferentem and reasonable expectations up to the
resultant California doctrine established by Gray and its progeny. Part II
discusses Gray as the basis for subsequent California case law pertaining to
insurance coverage disputes. Part III recounts California Civil Code section
1649 and its traditional applications prior to the implementation of Gray, its
rudimentary incursions into the domain of insurance contracts, and its
subsequent emergence as California's dominant doctrine. Part III also
contrasts the Gray approach with the section 1649 analysis in Bank of the
West. Section 1649's probable effects on California insurance law will also
be discussed. This article concludes that Gray's reasonable expectations
approach should have been retained.
The logical starting point for this inquiry begins with the traditional
contract interpretation rules which were supplanted by Gray and the
reasonable expectations doctrine.
I. HISTORY
The history of insurance contract interpretation, at least until Gray v.
Zurich and its progeny, mirrored the prevailing socio-economic conditions
and philosophical theories which affected legal doctrine through the years.'
Modern insurance contract interpretation theory is derived from traditional
contract law.
A. The Treatment of Insurance Policies as "Ordinary" Contracts
Originally, the courts treated insurance policies like all other contracts.
Historically, the primary purpose behind judicial contract construction was
ascertaining the intent of the parties when they entered into the agreement.'
The language in the contract was viewed as the "Rossetta Stone" through
which the objective manifestation of intente could be discerned.' Because
22. The discussion infra at parts I.A., I.B., and I.C. will establish that a link between
"freedom of contract" notions and traditional contract interpretation principles exists while
status-based contract construction is allied with the reasonable expectations doctrine.
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (West 1985); 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
538, at 55 (1960).
24. Judge Learned Hand once said that in the law of contracts, the intent of the parties is
established by writings (acts) of the parties which "ordinarily" signify intent. Hotchklss v.
National City Bank of New York, 200 F.287, 293 (D.C.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2nd Cir.
N.Y. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). Thus, "the meaning of the words or other conduct of
a party may not necessarily be the meaning he expects or understands." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
of Contracts § 200 cmt. b (1979).
[Vol. 29
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of the grave importance placed upon the "language and terms" embodied
in the contract, drafting of clear contract language was a crucial endeavor.
In short, insurance policy construction in the early years hardly ever strayed
far from the four corners of the contract document.2
In 1910, the California Supreme Court in Pacific Heating and Ventilat-
ing Co. v. Williamsburgh City Fire Insurance Co. of Brooldyri had this to
say about the status of insurance policies in the overall contracts scheme:
A policy of insurance is but a contract, and like all other contracts it must
be construed according to the language and terms used therein in order to
arrive at its true sense and meaning. Courts will not undertake to relieve
25. The process of construing terms in the contract is an activity which seeks to derive the
"plain meaning" of the words and symbols used. Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and
Construction of Contracts, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 833, 838 (1964). Whenever plain meaning is
derived from the contract language, the court will not look elsewhere. Id. The "plain meaning"
rule may be subject to certain pitfalls, namely: (1) It does not apply to ambiguous provisions (the
court will have to evaluate extrinsic evidence on such occasions), (2) It only applies if the
meaning derived is not unconscionable (unconscionability voids the contract), (3) There may be
different versions of this one "plain meaning" in vernacular use or in the "universal dictionary"
(in situations like this, the court must ascertain the one "appropriate" meaning), (4) Customary,
local, or trade usages may vary from the derived "plain meaning" (wherein the court must
determine whether proof of such specialized usage exists). Id. at 839.
26. "LThe] traditional doctrine gave great deference to the drafter's terms." Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1174, 1183-84 (1983).
27. "The ideal result that legal draftsmen seek to attain and that judicial interpreters
commonly seek to find in a written contract is that a judge should be able, by reading the
contract without lifting his eyes from the page, to determine its one and only "true" meaning
in relation to the issues being litigated." Patterson, supra note 25, at 838. But "a clear and
definite mind is a rarity; an artist in the use of words is as great a rarity." 3 CORBIN, supra note
23, § 534.
28. Professor Rakoff enumerated four propositions which represented the traditional
construction approach:
1) The party who has an opportunity to read the document and signs it is taken to
have assented to it and is thereby bound.
2) There is no legal relevance as to whether a party has subjectively read, under-
stood, or assented to the contract terms.
3) The assent of the party covers the entire document; this includes terms that may
or may not have been dickered over.
4) There are very narrow exceptions to the traditional rules. Failure of the drafting
party to explain form terms is not an exception. The only acceptable exception
involves intentional creation of a misunderstanding by the drafting party.
Rakoff, supra note 26, at 1185.
29. 111 P. 4 (Cal. 1910). Pacific Healing involved scrutiny of a fire insurance policy which
expressly disclaimed the insurer's liability for "loss caused directly or indirectly by invasion,
insurrection, riot, civil war or commotion, or military or usurped power, or by order of any
civil authority; or for loss or damage occasioned by or through any volcano, earthquake.. ."
Id. at 4. The court held that the semi-colon separating the "war" clause from the natural
disaster clauses effectively removed damage occasioned by earthquakes from the limiting
provision: "caused directly or indirectly." Id. at 5. The insured, whose property was destroyed
by a fire which started in another building following an earthquake, was covered by the policy.
Id. This was because after the earthquake, the insured building was undamaged and it was the
subsequent fire, for which the policyholder plainly had coverage, which effectively caused the
damage. Id.
5
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parties from the express and plain stipulations into which they have
entered. s
This sentiment was echoed in Kautz v. Zurich General Accident and
Liability Insurance Co., Ltd.3 where the insurer sought to escape liability
by contending that: (1) the auto insurance policy expressly excluded coverage
for injuries occasioned by persons "not legally operating" the auto (the
driver, who had permission from the owner to operate the vehicle, was
intoxicated), and (2) the policyholder did not adhere to an express condition
that the car be used, garaged, and maintained in a specified city.32 In
finding for the insured, the court noted that the policy was silent regarding
the duty of the insured to inform the insurer about changes of address and
location of principal usage, maintenance and operation of the vehicle; nor
were there express limitations imposed for such a move.' Moreover, the
term "legally operating" was ambiguous' and the interpretation given by
the insured was more in line with the intentions of the parties when entering
into the agreement. 5
Similarly, when the court determined the insurer's duty to defend a
policyholder in a third party negligence action in Lamb v. Belt Casualty
Co. ,1 the court disregarded extrinsic evidence pertaining to the insurer's
preliminary investigation of the lawsuit. 7 The court declared that the
fundamental analysis should involve the contract language itself, and it was
there that specific terms binding the insurer were found.3
The prevailing notion that the insurance policy was first and foremost a
contract was subject to a caveat which could operate in favor of the
policyholder when the insurance contract contained ambiguous terms. In
Pacific Heating, the court noted that:
It is... a fundamental rule that the insurer is in duty bound to use such
language as to make the conditions, exceptions and provisions of the policy
clear to the ordinary mind, and in case it fails to do so, any ambiguity or
30. Id. at5.
31. 300 P. 34 (Cal. 1931).
32. Id. at 36.
33. Id. at 37-38. It was also note4 by the court that the area where the car was being
operated, maintained and garaged was contiguous with the city of San Francisco which was the
venue of coverage specified in the contract endorsement. Id. at 37.
34. Id. at 37. This gave rise to the interpretation rule of contra proferentem wherein
ambiguous contract language mandates construction against the drafter of the contract. Id. at
36-37. Contra proferentem is discussed more fully infra part I.B.
35. The insured contended that the policy only excluded coverage in situations when the car
was being driven illegally-that is without the permission of the insured. Id. at 37. The court
agreed that the express provision was not so broad as to exclude coverage for driving while in
violation of any law. Id.
36. 40 P.2d 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1935).
37. Id. at 314.
38. Id.
[Vol. 29
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reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the insured and against the
insurer.
39
This was the traditional contract construction rule of contra proferentem.'
B. Contra Proferentem4'
The doctrinal foundation for the modem reasonable expectations
principle in insurance law is found in the venerable rule of contra prof-
erentem.42 Under this rule, uncertain or ambiguous contract language is
construed against the party who drafted the terms or selected the wording of
the contract.' Faced with ascertaining the meaning of uncertain or
ambiguous contract terms, courts initially analyze "all existing usages,
general, local, technical, trade, and the custom and agreement of the two
parties with each other"' including the relevant circumstances and commu-
nications surrounding the agreement.' If the initial analysis does not
remove the uncertainty or ambiguity,' contra proferentem is traditionally
used as a judicial tool of last resort 7 and the ambiguity is construed strictly
against the drafting party.48
39. Pacific Heating, 111 P. at 5. The court made a similar observation in Kautz. See supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 34. Contra proferentem was applied to all contracts containing ambiguous
language but was "more rigorously applied in insurance than in other contracts, in recognition
of the difference between the parties in their acquaintance with the subject matter." Gaunt v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. Conn. 1947), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 849 (1947) (footnote omitted).
41. The term contra proferentem is a short form of the latin phrase: "Omnia praesumuntur
contra proferentem." Edwin W. Patterson, supra note 25, at 854. The term literally means:
All things are presumed "against the party who proffers or puts forward a thing." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Professor Williston included contra proferentem in his treatise among "secondary rules."
3 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 621, at 1788
(1936). Professor Patterson regards the doctrine as a "secondary maxim" of contract
interpretation. Patterson, supra note 25, at 852, 854.
43. 3 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 42. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 206 (1979); 3 CORBIN, supra note 23, § 559 at 262.
44. 3 CORBIN, supra note 23, § 559. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of Contracts § 212
cmt. b (1979).
45. Id. See generally Patterson, supra note 25, at 838-55 (providing a clear and concise
explanation of traditional contract construction rules).
46. If the court deems the ambiguity too great, the inquiry may end here with a determination
of non-existence of contract. But if the court recognizes that the parties indeed attempted to
make a binding agreement, and the only doubt remaining concerns two feasible and rational
interpretations, then contra proferentem will apply. 3 CORBIN, supra note 23, § 559.
47. Miller, supra note 12 at 1851. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 23, § 559; see also supra note
42.
48. Professor Williston pronounced an alternate version of the rule: "[Tihe contract, if
ambiguous, will be interpreted in favor of the promisee." 3 WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra
note 42, at 1789. Williston recognized that most of the time, the promisor drafts the contracts
in these types of cases. Id. at 1788-89. Application of contra proferentem arose out of the
realization that the party who chooses the contract language: (1) will naturally safeguard her own
7
Romaker and Prieto: Expectations Lost: Bank of the West v. Superior Court Places the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
90 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
Contra Proferentem was easily incorporated into the field of insurance.
California courts consistently held that as a matter of black letter law,
ambiguous49 policy provisions were to be construed against the insurer (who
drafts the policy and controls its language) and in favor of the insured."°
For example, in Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Construction
Co., ' the California Supreme Court acknowledged the rule that ambiguous
provisions are construed against the insurer.52 The court held that insurance
contract terms must be interpreted in the most inclusive sense for the benefit
of the insured.5 3 Accordingly, the court read a provision limiting coverage
to certain officials including "managing employees" to cover a regular
employee/driver who was "in control of" and therefore "managing" the
vehicle at the time of the accident.'
In time, use of contra proferentem was strained beyond its traditional
doctrinal underpinnings which led to awkward applications of the rule.5'
It was under these conditions that courts, struggling to apply their equitable
powers under color of an unmalleable doctrine,56 turned to the concept of
interests more carefully than that of the other party, and (2) will probably be more aware of any
dubious meanings inherent in the chosen language. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 206 cmt. a (1979); C. 3 CORBIN, supra note 23, § 559 at 270 (noting that contra proferentem
is "chiefly a rule of public policy .. .favoring the underdog").
49. "Ambiguity arises when policy language may reasonably be interpreted in two or more
ways." Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 280 Cal. Rptr. 766, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1991),
review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 2891 (Cal. 1991).
50. See e.g., Arenson v. Nat'l Auto. & Casulty Ins. Co., 286 P.2d 816, 818 (Cal. 1955);
Coit v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 168 P.2d 163, 165 (Cal. 1946). See also 39 Cal.
Jur.3d Insurance Contracts § 42 (1977) ("Since an insurance policy is drawn by the insurer, and
since the insurer is bound to use such language as to make the provisions of the contract clear
to the ordinary mind, any ambiguity . . .is to be resolved against the insurer.") (footnotes
omitted).
51. 296 P.2d 801 (Cal. 1956).
52. Id. at 805, 809.
53. Id. at 810.
54. The court defined "manage" in accordance with Webster's Dictionary and derived a
somewhat forced and awkward reading of the term "managing employee." Id.
55. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 6.2, at 628-30 (Student ed.
1988). Judge Keeton cited Lachs v. Fidelity & Casulty Co. of N.Y., 118 N.E.2d 555 (N.Y.
1954), reh'g denied, 120 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1954) & Steven v. Fidelity & Casulty Co., 377
P.2d at 868. Both cases involved the purchase of airline trip insurance. Steven will be
discussed in more detail infra part I.C. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
56. Mechanical use of construing ambiguities against insurers invites inconsistency and
confused results. Martin Kamarck, Opening the Gate: The Steven Case and the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 159 (1978). Two drawbacks can be
ascertained from strict compliance with the doctrine of construing ambiguities against the
insurer: (1) At times, courts are unable to stretch the doctrine so far as to encompass
undoubtedly nebulous contract terms, id. (citing Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club of S. Cal.
v. Veji, 118 Cal. Rptr. 596, 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1975)) and (2) courts will eventually
concoct ambiguities and interpret the contract in direct contravention of its expressed terms. Id.
"Hence, the court which adheres mechanically to the rule of construing ambiguity against the
draftsman ... either ... allow[s] perceived "wrongs" to go unremedied or ... creat[es]
"remedies" based on strained factual interpretation." Id.
8
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"honoring reasonable expectations."57 The doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions appeared to: (1) provide much needed legitimacy to decisions holding
contrary to traditional contract construction rules, and (2) serve the judicial
need to exercise equity where it was needed.
C. Adhesion Contracts and the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine"
1. The Adhesion Doctrine Develops as a Reaction to Form Contracts,
Standardized Language and "Freedom of Contract""
Because of perceived shortcomings inherent in the traditional interpreta-
tion rule of contra proferentemf reform-minded courts developed the
adhesion contract theory61 as: (1) a means of achieving the flexibility absent
in contra proferentem and (2) a legitimizing force in light of insurance law
decisions holding contrary to established contract construction norms.
Notions of laissez faire62 and "freedom of contract"" provided the ratio-
nale for remaining faithful to traditional contract interpretation rules.' The
57. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 55, at 628-32.
58. Because the adhesion theory applies to all other contracts as well as insurance contracts,
the discussion below is not reserved exclusively for insurance contract cases.
59. "Freedom of contract" is a principle which assumes that individuals are free to "shop
around" and choose whom to enter contracts with and thus escape any oppressive agreements.
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 630 (1943). As the discussion infra in the present section will show, the
insurance contract obviates any individualized bargaining or exercise of choices on the insured's
part, thus the rationale of "freedom of contract" is problematic when used in the insurance
contract domain.
60. Kessler points out that allowing for this type of recovery via the "back door" leads to
inconsistency and places unfair pressure on the stability of the insurance industry which relies
on precise calculation of risks in order to flourish. See id. at 635.
61. The concept of the adhesion contract was first introduced to American legal theory by
Professor Patterson in 1919. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy,
33 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1919). Professor Patterson specifically categorized the life insurance
policy as a classic adhesion contract in view of the fact that the insurer drafts the contract while
the insured "merely 'adheres'" to the contract with "little choice as to its terms." Id. at 222.
The doctrine of adhesion contracts originated in Continental Europe from the studies of the
German Civil Code conducted by the French jurist, Raymond Saleilles. Patterson, supra note
25, at 856-57. The concept was further expanded by the French Professor Demogue in 1910.
Id. The theory grew out of the initial reluctance of courts to admit extrinsic evidence under
traditional contract doctrine to the gradual acceptance of such evidence in order to show which
side drafted the agreement. Id. In addition, if the drafting party was in a stronger bargaining
position, prevailing twentieth century concepts of justice favored the weaker party, and as such,
formed the basis of modem adhesion contract doctrine. Id.
62. "Expresses a political-economic philosophy of the government allowing the marketplace
to operate relatively free of restrictions and intervention." BLACK'S LAV DICTIONARY 876 (6th
ed. 1990).
63. See supra note 59.
64. Professor Kessler quoted Sir G. Jessel's oft-cited passage to exhibit the almost religious
reverence paid to traditional contract construction rules under freedom of contract: "[Mien of
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and... their
contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by
Courts of justice." Kessler, supra note 59, at 631 (quoting Sir G. Jessel in, Printing and
9
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traditional freedom of contract theory recognized that parties were free to
choose whom to enter an agreement with and thus escape the consequences
of an "oppressive" bargain.' At the same time, contracting parties were
deemed capable of protecting their own interests.' The freedom of contract
theory, therefore, justified identical judicial treatment of all contracts.
However, the theory seemed to lose validity as the use of form contracts
containing standardized language67 offered to the consumer in a "take-it-or-
leave-it" manner' increasingly formed the basis of frequent contract
disputes.9
Equality in bargaining power is no longer the norm in today's world of
monolithic business entities and impersonal business transactions.' ° The
language of the present economic and social agreement is the language of the
standardized form contract. The overpowering utility of the form contract
to present day enterprise is its ability to identify, standardize, and limit
risks. 71 Nowhere has the desire to quantify, limit, and manage risk been
Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875)).
65. Id. at 630.
66. Id. Furthermore, Freedom of Contract assumes that (I) contracts are private matters-not
social institutions and thus, courts may only interpret the agreements and not create contracts
for the parties and (2) a party is presumed to know about a contract she entered into. Id.
67. "Standardized agreements are commonly prepared by one party. The customer assents
to a few terms, typically inserted in blanks on the printed form, and gives blanket assent to the
type of transaction embodied in the standard form." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
§ 211 cmt. c (1979). The evolution of the freely bargained contract to the standard form
contract demonstrated the economic progression towards mass production. Kessler, supra note
59, at 631. Insurance contracts originated from individual agreements at Lloyd's Coffeehouse
in London entered into by parties of roughly equal bargaining power. Keeton, supra note 21
at 966. For a general overview of the birth of the insurance contract at Lloyd's, see William
R. Vance, The History of the Development of the Warranty in Insurance Law, 20 YALE L.J. 523
(1911).
68. Kessler, supra note 59, at 632 ("[S]tandardized contracts are frequently contracts of
adhesion; they are a prendre ou a laisser.")
69. "'Today freedom of contract does not commend itself to us as a social ideal in quite the
same way. In the more complicated social conditions of our industrialized society it wins
approval only to the extent that there is reasonable equality of bargaining power between the
parties and no injury is done to the economic community at large. The moral principle that
persons should abide by their agreements is today met by the equally cogent principle that one
should not take advantage of an unfair contract which one has persuaded another to enter into
under economic or social pressure. . .'." Akin v. Business Title Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 287, 291(Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1968) (quoting from C.H. Bright, Controls of Adhesion and Exemption
Clauses, 41 Austl. L.J. 261, 266 (1967) (excerpted from statement by Phillip Jeffry)).
70. Kessler, supra note 59, at 631.
71. Kamarek, supra note 56, at 157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt.
a (1979) (detailing the usefulness of the standard contract in streamlining internal business
operations as well as minimizing cost by treating certain transactions as a class instead of
individually). See also Keeton, supra note 21, at 966 (explaining that interests in simplification,
clarity, and precision gave rise to the increased use of the form contract). The form contract
is evidence of what has been called the rise of "ne-formalism" in contracts law. Id.
Formalism denotes a "strict. . . attention to... outward forms." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 530 (3d College ed. 1991). There is a parallel judicial rationale called Legal
Formalism which is "the traditional view that correct legal decisions are determined by pre-
existing legal precedent, and the courts must reach their decisions solely based upon logical
deduction, applying the facts of a particular case to a set of pre-existing rules." Peter Nash
10
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more apparent than in the insurance industry?2 The industry's pioneering
efforts at conquering risk through the form contract paved the way for other
businesses to use similar methods.'
Six features of the standardized insurance contract disturbed the courts.
These features are: (1) Unequal bargaining power, 4 (2) the inability of the
consumer to control any of the contract terms, 5 (3) the tendency of such
contracts to be offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 6 (4) the quasi-public
nature of' or universal need for the product or service offered," (5) the
fact that the consumer rarely, if ever, reads the contract,79 or (6) even if the
consumer does read the contract, they may not understand it.' These
concerns resulted in different treatment for insurance contracts and other
adhesion contracts."1 Thus, in determining the enforceability of certain
terms in a contract exhibiting the suspect characteristics outlined above,
courts began to look outside of the contract itself. The statuss2 of the
Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Fornal for the Function, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1040 (1991).
72. "The standard clauses in insurance policies are the most striking illustrations of successful
attempts... to select and control risks assumed under a contract. The insurance business . .
. first realized the full importance of... 'judicial risk', the danger that a court or jury may
be swayed by 'irrational factors' to decide against a powerful defendant." Kessler, supra note
59, at 631.
73. Id.
74. See Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 552 P.2d at 1185.
75. See Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exch., 682 P.2d at 1105-06.
76. Kessler, supra note 59, at 632.
77. See e.g., Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 456 P.2d at 680 n.5; Gray, 419 P.2d
at 179. See generally Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public
Service Enterprise in the New Industrialized State, 55 CAiF. L. REv. 1247 (1967) (discussing
the new judicially mandated protection of economically weaker entities from powerful private
entities performing quasi-public obligations).
78. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 84, 92 (N.J. 1960).
79. Rakoff, supra note 26, at 1179 n.21 and accompanying text. See Eugene Wollan &
Jeffrey S. Weinstein, Great (or Reasonable) Expectations, BEST'S REVIEW-PROPERTY-
CASUALTY INSURANCE EDITION, May, 1990, at 84 ("In the real world, most individual insureds
do not read their policies. They check to make sure their names are spelled correctly, and then
they file the policy away without a second thought until a loss occurs. This inevitably leads to
a situation where the policy does not provide coverage for a loss for which the insured assumed
he had coverage.").
80. "[Standardized language limiting insurance coverage], prepared by lawyers, defended by
lawyers and authoritatively interpreted by lawyers, are probably not appreciated by the lay
insured." Gray, 419 P.2d at 175 n. 14 (quoting from Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend
Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734, 748 (1966)).
81. This basic realization was echoed time and again in California Supreme Court treatment
of insurance contracts. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (FMC Corp.), 799 P.2d
1253, 1265 (Cal. 1990) ("These rules stem from the fact that the insurer typically drafts policy
language, leaving the insured little or no opportunity to bargain for modifications."); Garcia,
682 P.2d at 1105-06 (drafting policy language, unequal bargaining power); Barrera, 456 P.2d
at 680 n.5 (quasi-public nature of insurance business).
82. The shift from form to status as the controlling factor in interpretation of adhesion
contracts marks a dramatic deviation from notions of freedom of contract. See Kessler, supra
note 59, at 640 (arguing that freedom of contract does not guarantee equal freedom for all
parties and may become a "one-sided privilege" in favor of the stronger parties). Freedom of
11
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parties as well as the relevant circumstances surrounding the agreement
gained importance.'a
2. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Sets the Stage for General
Acceptance of the Adhesion Contract Doctrine
The landmark decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield MotorsP set the
tone for future adjudication of standardized form contract disputes. Justice
Francis, writing for the New Jersey Supreme Court conceded that freedom
of contract which mandates strict adherence to the contract language is "an
important factor."" However, under the same breath, the court recognized
the inability of traditional contract doctrine to surmount the novel problems
raised by the adhesion contract.s6 The court made a radical departure from
traditional rules of contract construction.' This decision, the precursor of
modern consumer protection cases proclaimed that contracts of adhesion (or
standardized form contracts) must be read in light of their realistic and
pragmatic effects."5 The court construed the contract by appraising the
social policy implications arising from the bargaining position of the
consumer "in today's economy." 9  The court essentially rewarded the
reasonable expectations of the consumer by voiding the contract's limiting
provisions as unconscionable ° and creating the concept of implied warran-
ties.91 The assault on traditional notions of contract interpretation governing
contract surmounted the status based classifications of the feudal system, but the reality of
today's business practices requires a return to status-based distinctions derived from natural law
in contracting. Id. at 641-42. The law, Kessler contends, should be malleable enough to fit the
ever-changing needs of society. Id.
83. See Gray, 419 P.2d at 171-72 (establishing in California that the "relationship" of the
parties must also be analyzed in construing adhesion contract terms). Several articles discuss
the importance of the new status-based distinction. See e.g., Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 77;
Barbara B. Rintala, Foreword: "Status" Concepts in the Law of Torts, 58 CAuF. L. REv. 80
(1970).
84. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). In Hermingsen, the plaintiff brought suit against a car dealer
for the sale of a defective automobile. Id. at 73. The dealership utilized a form contract
containing difficult to read and hard to find terms absolving the dealership from liability. Id.
at 74-75. The New Jersey Supreme Court delivered progressive holdings for the two issues
confronting the bench: issues of implied warranty of merchantability and exclusionary language
expressed in boilerplate contract documents.
85. Id. at 84.
86. Id.
87. Id. The court quoted approvingly from the Kessler article cited in the present work (supra
note 59) to justify the unconventional treatment of the contract at issue. Id. at 86.
88. Id. at 84.
89. Id.
90. The location of and manner in which the disclaimers appeared in the contract document
also affected the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 89-92. An argument that the rules invoked
by the court here was limited to industries assuming a quasi-public nature was repudiated by the
court which likened the automobile industry to common carriers because of the widespread
societal reliance on the automotive industry to fulfill the basic need for transportation. Id. at
92.
91. Id. at 84.
12
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adhesion contracts had begun. The inescapable conclusion to be derived
from the adhesion theory was simply this: Contracts of adhesion are special
and must be treated differently from other contracts.
3. California Adopts the Adhesion Contract Theory
Under The Guidance of Justice Tobriner
The California Supreme Court defined an adhesion contract as: "[A]
standardized contract . . . imposed and drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength [which] relegates to the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. " ' Justice Matthew
Tobriner may be called the architect of the adhesion contract doctrine in
California.'
In a 1972 essay,' Tobriner likened the development of the insurance-
contract-as-adhesion-contract-doctrine with that of the then burgeoning law
of products liability.9' He proposed that the laws of products liability and
insurance contract interpretation merit special rules (what he termed a
"status" approach) because of the unique roles and social functions played
by both insurance carriers and mass producers.' In the field of insurance
law, this meant a departure from traditional contract interpretation dogma to
the construction rules of the adhesion contract in adjudicating policy disputes.
The "Tobriner trilogy," Neal v. State Farm Insurance Companies,'
Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. of New York,9" and Gray v.
92. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981). The Supreme Court
utilized the definition forwarded by then Judge Tobriner in Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
Rptr. at 784. In Graham, the California Supreme Court held that a standard musicians' union
form contract between a musical promoter and a musical group was an adhesion contract. 623
P.2d at 171.
93. Charles L. Hurd & Philip L. Bush, Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience for
California Consumers, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 33 n.185 (1973). Justice Tobriner evinced a
penetrating interest in the socio-economic considerations facing the consumer in an era of mass
production and powerful conglomerates which typified a concern for the ability of the law to
conform to current situational realities. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 77. For an eye-
opening view of the use and abuse of the standard form contract by California businesses and
the inefficient legal response thereof, see W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in
California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974).
94. Matthew 0. Tobriner, Retrospect: Ten Years on the California Supreme Court, 20 UCLA
L. REV. 5 (1972).
95. Id. at 8-11. The ambiguous insurance contract is analogous to a defective product. Both
do not provide the consumer with the safety and security expected after purchasing the product
or service; the consumer usually cannot recognize the defect in the product or coverage until
harm occurs while the producer (drafter) is in a much better position to prevent the problem
from arising to begin with.
96. Id. at 8 ("I suspect that the mass producer and mass carrier, in common, evidence a
liability based not on privity, or willed contract, but on the role they play in society-on the
societal functions they assume.").
97. 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Ct. App. I Dist. 1961).
98. 377 P.2d 284 (Cal. 1962).
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Zurich Insurance Co.,' comprised a progressive set of cases through which
Justice Tobriner translated his concerns for equity into a doctrine covering
adhesion contract interpretation.10e The resulting doctrine which reached
its zenith in Gray governed California's law pertaining to insurance contract
construction for almost three decades.
In Neal, Tobriner, then a judge of the First District Court of Appeals,
opined that the standard form contract provided by an employer insurance
company for use in its hiring of employee-agents was an adhesion con-
tract.'0' It was important to the court that the contract was drafted by the
party of greater bargaining strength, while the weaker party or "adherent"
had no option but to either take the contract as it was or leave it."~z The
opinion declared that the contract in question "[did] not issue from that
freedom in bargaining and equality in bargaining which are the theoretical
parents of the American law of contracts.""
After discussing the wide-reaching effect of standardized contracts in
daily life, the court held that the canon of resolving ambiguities against the
drafter "applies with peculiar force in the case of the contract of adhe-
sion."" The court's rationale relied heavily upon the work of Professor
Kessler.1°5
The controlling principle exemplified by Gray v. Zurich built upon the
foundation laid by Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co."°  In Steven, the
decedent purchased and sent away for flight insurance from a vending
machine located by the ticket desk of a commercial airliner prior to his
departure.0 7  One of Steven's scheduled flights was canceled.103  Mr.
Steven, aided by an agent of the canceling airline, located and chartered a
plane from a small airline outfit."e The plane crashed-killing Steven.110
The insurer refused to pay out the claim based upon exclusionary language
99. 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966).
100. See Kamarek, supra note 56, at 164 ("Justice Tobriner has been deeply concerned with
the responsibility of the law to protect the individual from the abuses of concentrated economic
power, and his opinions in Steven and Gray are informed with an understanding that the
adhesion contract is but a manifestation of this larger problem." (footnote omitted)).
101. Neal, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Kessler, supra note 59.
106. For an enlightening discourse on the Steven case and its role in the development of the
reasonable expectations doctrine in California, see Kamarck, supra note 56.
107. Steven, 377 P.2d at 286.
108. Id. at 286-87.
109. Id. at 287.
110. Id.
[Vol. 29
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in both the insuring clause111 and definitions section of the insurance con-
tract."' The Steven court pronounced two rationales for finding coverage
in this instance: (1) construing ambiguities against the insurer as drafter of
the contract113 and (2) the necessity of bringing exclusionary language to
the attention of the insured. 1 4 This latter concern was a response to two
additional concerns: (a) unfair surprise and (b) defeating the reasonable
expectations of the promisee; both of which would make enforcement of the
terms unconscionable. 5 The doctrine of reasonable expectations, like the
111. "Provision in insurance policy or bond which recites the agreement of the insurer to
protect the insured against some form of loss or damage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (6th
ed. 1990).
112. Under the insuring clause, the insurer agreed to pay for losses caused by accidental bodily
injury incurred during the first one-way trip or during the return trip provided that a round trip
ticket was procured prior to the purchase of the insurance policy. Steven, 377 P.2d at 288. The
clause further provided that the policy only covered travel using "a transportation ticket ...
covering the whole of said airline trip, issued... for transportation on an aircraft operated by
a scheduled airline carrier." Id. The policy then defined "scheduled airline carrier" as either:.
(1) a U.S. carrier possessing a Certificate of Public Convenience issued by the Civil Aeronautics
Board which publishes rates and schedules for passenger service between specified cities at
regular scheduled times, (2) foreign registered aircraft, and (3) U.S. registered airlines which
could fly legally within the boundaries of a specified state during published and regular time
intervals. Id. Excluded from the definition set up above were military flights and flights on
aircraft considered by civil aviation authorities to be either irregular or unscheduled air carriers.
Id. The Court found it important that the risk incurred by the insurer is substantially unchanged
in a substituted conveyance. Id. at 289.
113. The Court based its holding upon two ambiguities found in the insurance contract. (1)
The first ambiguity concerned the availability of coverage for substituted land transportation
expressed in the contract. Justice Tobriner reasoned that Mr. Steven, or the reasonable person
in his shoes, would have expected coverage for a substituted flight in the exigency of an
emergency. Id. at 288-289. Even if the policy expressly provided for coverage on land
transportation in such situations, it was not sufficiently clear that the coverage was for alternate
land transportation exclusively. Id. at 289. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
("mention of one matter excludes all others") did not apply because "the maxim... is... a
legalistic concept [which] hardly enters into the thinking of the reasonable layman. As we have
stated, we interpret an insurance contract in the light of that understanding." Id. at 290. (2) The
definition of "Scheduled Air Carrier" was ambiguous because the ill-fated flight taken by Steven
comprised a third category of air carrier not specifically defined or excluded in the policy and
as such, did not apprise Mr. Steven about non-coverage. Id. at 290-92.
114. Id. at 290.
115. "mhe potential for unconscionable insurance policy provisions provides [the reasonable
expectations doctrine's] . . . chief motivating force." Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable
Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 338. Professor Rahdert points out that
insurance companies are in a unique position to be able to insert various definitions, exclusions,
exceptions, and conditions which shift risks to the consumer into the policy without arousing any
suspicions on the part of the policyholder. Id. at 341. The potential for such activity is related
to the "lopsidedness" inherent in the typical adhesion bargain. Id. at 339. Accord Logan v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1974) (expla-
ining that courts do not effectuate clauses which are unclear, unexpected, inconspicuous, or
unconscionable). See Graham v. Scissor Tail, 623 P.2d 165, 172-73 (Cal. 1989) (listing two
limitations imposed upon the enforcement of a contract of adhesion, one of which was the
equitable principle denying enforcement of unduly "oppressive" or unconscionable provisions
attributed by the California Supreme Court to Steven).
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equitable principle of mistake116 and unconscionability1"7 may be invoked
by the courts to invalidate a contract or certain portions thereof.
Steven modified contra proferentem by elevating it from a "tie-breaker"
rule into a legitimate primary interpretation theorem justified by public
policy."' In addition, construction of the ambiguity against the insurer
was tied by the court to considerations revolving around the reasonable
expectations of coverage derived from the agreement by the policyhold-
er. 119
Because Steven had reasonable expectations of coverage in the instant
case, it was incumbent upon the insurer to make the exclusions from the
expected coverage as clear as possible." Since the insurer failed to bring
the exclusions to the attention of the policyholder,"' the policy provisions
116. Under the mistake doctrine, reformation of the contract may be had when there is an
erroneous belief regarding some fact material to the agreed exchange of performances.
RESTAITEMNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 cmt. a (1979). When there is only one mistaken
party, the contract is voidable (1) if that party does not bear the risk of the mistake, (2)
enforcement of the contract in light of the situation would be unconscionable, or (3) the other
party knew or should have known about the mistaken belief. Id. § 153.
117. A court may refuse to enforce certain terms in a contract if doing so would lead to an
unconscionable result. Id. § 208. Like the adhesion theory, which provides the rationale for the
doctrine of reasonable expectations, in determining whether a contract term is unconscionable,
one relevant factor that may be considered is the disparity in the bargaining process. Id. § 208
cmt. a & cmt. d.
118. "The rule of resolving ambiguities against the insurer does not serve as a mere tie
breaker; it rests upon fundamental considerations of public policy." Steven, 377 P.2d at 290.
The decision stressed the fact that, in light of the circumstances surrounding the purchase of the
insurance, Steven did not get a chance to read the contract terms. Id. at 294. The policies
supporting the holding of this case were derived from the adhesion theory discussed supra in this
work. See Kamarck, supra note 56, at 159-61. Professor Kamarck discussed the Steven court's
rejection of a "mechanistic analysis" in construing ambiguities against the drafter for one within
which "a larger principle was at work." At the "heart" of the Steven analysis, Kamarck opined,
were "fundamental considerations of policy" buttressed by the doctrine of adhesion contracts and
the necessity of making exclusionary language sufficiently clear to an adhering party who has
reasonable expectations of coverage. Id. See Miller, supra note 12, at 1852 (noting change from
presumption of unfair language to per se contra-insurer application of contra proferentem).
119. Steven, 377 P.2d at 288-89. Compare Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160
F.2d 599, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 841 (1947). Finding coverage for the
insured in Gaunt, Judge Learned Hand articulated his view that in the sphere of life insurance,
the policyholder develops expectations of coverage as soon as the insurance application form is
completed and payment is tendered; not upon "acceptance" of the application by the insurance
company. Id. As in Stevens, the Gaunt decision utilized the doctrine of contra proferentem but
similarly analyzed the expectations derived by the policyholder in the transaction as a factor.
120. Steven, 377 P.2d at 288-90. The risk undertaken by the insurer would not have been
magnified by coverage on unscheduled airliners and coverage for substituted transportation "fell
within the obligation undertaken by the insured," thus the need for making such exclusion clear
to the insured. Id. at 290.
121. The Court reached this conclusion based upon the circumstances surrounding the purchase
of the insurance policy. Although the policy contained a heading in bold print which read in
part: "NOR FOR TRAVEL ON OTHER THAN SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS," it was not
clear whether the physical position of the document inside the vending machine obstructed said
heading from Steven's view. Id. at 286. Justice Tobriner theorized that even if Steven had read
the bold print exclusion, he probably did not have the opportunity to read the definitions of
"Scheduled Air Carrier." Id. at 293-94. Moreover, the Court held that "the manner of sale
negated any possibility of such notice." Id.
16
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were construed against the insurer. Based upon the frequency with which the
opinion mentioned Steven's reasonable expectations, it would seem that
reasonable expectations, rather than the ambiguity itself, was the primary
trigger for construing ambiguities against the insurer.122 It was up to
Gray" to sever the reasonable expectations doctrine from Steven's hybrid
form of construing ambiguities against the insurer and refine it into the final
form of the reasonable expectations doctrine in California.
In 1966, Gray v. Zurich established the reasonable expectations doctrine.
Zurich Insurance Company was sued for its failure to defend one of its
policyholders in a third-party suit alleging intentional assault.1" The
relevant issue facing the court involved the insurer's duty to defend its
policyholder from such a suit."z In addressing the scope of the insurer's
duty, the California Supreme Court adopted the reasonable expectations
doctrine. The court effectively removed adhesion contracts from the sphere
of traditional contract interpretation by these words:
[A] contract entered into between two parties of unequal bargaining
strength, expressed in the language of a standardized contract, written by
the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and offered to the
weaker party on a "take it or leave it basis" carries some consequences that
extend beyond orthodox implications. Obligations arising from such a
contract inure not alone from the consensual transaction but from the
relationship of the parties.12
Through Justice Tobriner, the Gray Court further opined that the adhesion
doctrine applied to insurance contracts and as such mandated a retreat from
the practice of "look[ing] to the words of [the] contract to find the meaning
which the parties expected from them."127 Thus, the court held that the
insurance policy, which is a contract of adhesion would be construed in light
of the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage.)1 The Gray reason-
able expectations doctrine drew scrutiny, but inspired many scholars, most
notably Judge Keeton.
122. It would appear that the California Supreme Court was leaning towards the establishment
of a doctrine which honored reasonable expectations even in the absence of an ambiguity in the
contract. California later adopted a version of the reasonable expectations doctrine which is
conditioned upon a finding of ambiguity in the contract. See discussion infra part II.B.1.
123. Gray is discussed in detail infra in Part II.
124. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 169 (Cal. 1966).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 171.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 171-72. Gray and the reasonable expectations doctrine will be treated more fully
infra Part II.
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4. The Keeton Theorem
By 1970, courts in various jurisdictions recognized a need to treat
adhesion contracts differently. Confusion developed as judges struggled with
diverse rationales"2 in hopes of doing as little damage to traditional
contract principles while zealously implementing some equitable relief for
weaker parties in insurance coverage disputes." Professor (now Judge)
Keeton's article, Insurance Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,"
granted a scholastic imprimatur upon the confusing array of court created
rationales by uniting them under a common rubric.12  Judge Keeton
observed that the many doctrines used by the courts to provide benefits
which were apparently beyond those technically provided for by the policy
were governed by a common principle." This broad principle, already
being applied defacto by the courts, was the doctrine of honoring reasonable
expectations. Keeton translated the new doctrine as follows: "The
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations."134
Ironically, Keeton's enunciation of the rule is open to two possible
interpretations.135 Professor Rahdert recognized these two distinct interpre-
tations as either the "strong form"" or the "weak form." 37
Using the strong form reading, the courts are to read the policy as a
whole, and simply determine whether a reasonable consumer would expect
coverage under the facts of the case. If the court determines that such an
expectation was reasonable, then coverage is provided. This would be true
129. Keeton named (1) strained forms of contra proferentem, (2) implicit references to
reasonable expectations under the general rubric of construing ambiguities against the drafter
(citing Steven discussed supra), (3) delivery of markedly different coverage from that applied
for, and (4) renewals granting lesser scope of coverage as the most popular rationales proposed
by the courts. Keeton, supra note 21, at 969-73.
130. Which led Professor Keeton to observe: "[T]he favorite generalization advanced by
outside observers to explain a judgement against an insurance company at variance with policy
provisions is the ambivalent, suggestive, and wholly unsatisfactory aphorism: 'It's an insurance
case.'" Id. at 961.
131. Keeton, supra note 21.
132. See Mayhew, supra note 12, at 276-77; Rahdert, supra note 115, at 333-34; Karen K.
Shinevar, Comment, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as
Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 MIcH. J.L. REF. 603, 611-12 (1980).
133. Keeton, supra note 21, at 967.
134. Id.
135. Rahdert, supra note 115, at 335.
136. Id. Under the strong form, the entire contract is analyzed and if it is sufficient under the
circumstances to give rise to reasonable expectations of coverage, the insured will prevail on the
coverage dispute.
137. Id. at 335-36. Professor Rahdert indicates that this reading is a variant of contra
proferentem differing only in the weak formulation's allowance for the "insured's circumstances
and lack of sophistication to be taken into account." Id. at 336.
[Vol, 29
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even if a technical reading of the policy would negate coverage. Consequent-
ly, an insured could be covered even if he admitted he had never read the
policy138 provided that extrinsic sources 139 created expectations of cover-
age which a person in the insured's position would expect under like circum-
stances.' 4
Six basic application principles derive from the strong Keeton formula:
(1) Courts may determine the existence of reasonable expectations through
extrinsic circumstances 41 or through the contract language. (2) The court
will interpret the insurance contract language from a reasonable layperson's
point of view; not through the understanding of a "sophisticated underwrit-
er."1 42  (3) Since under the "strong form" there is no mandatory require-
ment that the insured actually read the policy,143 the doctrine will apply
even in the absence of any ambiguity in the contract language." (4) The
insurer escapes liability if: (a) the insurer shows an unreasonable failure on
the policyholder's part to read the unusual but clearly worded contract terms
or (b) the insurer can prove that it called the insured's attention to the
express qualification when the agreement was entered into.4
(5) Even when express but ambiguous policy provisions are brought to the
insured's attention, such provisions will not be enforced if they are
138. "[Wlhether the policyholder sufficiently examined the policy is only one part of the
overall calculation of the objective reasonableness of his expectations." Keeton, supra note 21,
at 967.
139. Keeton did not address what extrinsic circumstances give rise to reasonable expectations.
Rahdert, supra note 115, at 335. Professor Rabdert alludes to what he calls the "good hands"
phenomenon arising out of present day insurers' advertising activities. Id. at 343. These
advertisements foster certain expectations in policyholders that they would be covered for almost
any contingency and under the circumstances, Rahdert posits, the expectations are reasonable.
Id. The California Supreme Court, however, noted that extrinsic evidence required to prove the
intent of the parties should include testimony regarding the "circumstances surrounding the
agreement," such as the object for and content of the writing pertinent to enabling the court to
analyze the exact situation when the agreement was reached. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968).
140. For cases involving court-mandated insurance coverage even when express limiting
provisions arguable excluded the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff, see generally Kievit v.
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22, 30 (N.J. 1961); Corgatelli v. Global Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 737 (Idaho 1975). Note the dissent of Justice Donaldson in
Corgatelli where he criticizes adoption of the reasonable expectations doctrine sans-ambiguity.
Corgatelli, 533 P.2d at 742-43.
141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
142. Keeton, supra note 21, at 967.
143. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
144. "[Nlot only should a policyholder's reasonable expectations be honored in the face of
difficult and technical language, but those expectations should prevail as well when the language
of an unusual provision is clearly understandable. . ." Keeton, supra note 21, at 968. The
rationale provided by Keeton for abandoning the requirement of ambiguity involved a
disapproving view of insurance marketing techniques and the use of convoluted policy language
which virtually negated any possibility that the insured would carefully read the policy (if he
even reads it at all). Id. By logical inference, the clarity or ambiguity of the language is
irrelevant since the language will most likely not be read.
145. Id.
19
Romaker and Prieto: Expectations Lost: Bank of the West v. Superior Court Places the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
unconscionable ("mislead the great majority of policyholders")." (6) A
particular policyholder's knowledge about limiting provisions which are not
generally known by a majority of policyholders does not negate coverage
under the doctrine.147 The strong Keeton formula was predated and
established in California law by the principal holding of Gray v. Zurich.14
The "weak form" of the Keeton formula was the version adopted by
most of the jurisdictions applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
The weak form reasonable expectations rule obtains from a looser reading of
the term "painstaking analysis" in Keeton's pronouncement of the rule. 49
Professor Rahdert proposed this translation of the weak form of the
reasonable expectations principle:
[E]xpectation[s] formed from a cursory reading of the policy, though
technically wrong, may yet be reasonable, and if so should be honored; but
... expectations derived from sources other than at least a cursory review
of the policy language are not reasonable, and should not be honored in the
face of unambiguous contrary policy language.' "°
The weak form is, in effect, a variant of contra proferentem but requires
construction against the insurer only when the language of the contract is
sufficiently ambiguous so as to create a reasonable expectation of cover-
age."' In the absence of any ambiguity, the terms of the insurance policy
will be interpreted according to their plain meaning.'52
Keeton advanced several rationales for the dramatic departure from
established contracts dogma in the insurance field. A survey of the
justifications include: (1) Countering the threat of overreaching by insurance
companies correlative to the unequal bargaining positions of the parties;"
146. Id. at 968-69.
147. "If the enforcement of a policy provision would defeat the reasonable expectations of the
great majority of policyholders to whose claims it is relevant, it will not be enforced even
against those who know of its restrictive terms." Id. at 974. Although the element of unfair
surprise is negated, the reasonable expectations doctrine is a corollary of the principle
disallowing unconscionable advantage. Id. Prohibition of unconscionable advantage requires
uniformity of application in the treatment of the ills brought about by the mass contract. Id.
Keaton reasoned that disallowing coverage in such an instance would, in effect, provide greater
protection to the ignorant policyholders for the same amount of money. Id.
148. See infra part II.A.2.
149. Rahdert, supra note 115, at 335.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 336. This reading can be easily reconciled with the rule proposed in Steven
discussed supra. Tobriner's opinion in Steven implied a yet undefined role for reasonableness
but predicated its holding on an impure form of contra proferentem.
152. See Fritz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 123 P.2d 622, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1942).
153. Keeton, supra note 21, at 964. Because the insurer controls the contract language, terms
unfavorable to the weaker party can easily be incorporated into the agreement by the insurer.
This is exacerbated by the fact that the insured party is faced with the classic adhesion
dilemma-he can take the terms as drafted or leave it. Although Judge Keeton used this
rationale to explain the doctrine of disallowing unconscionable advantage, he later asserts that
the principle of honoring reasonable expectations is closely related to disallowing unconsciona-
P~ol. 29
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(2) the utility and pervasiveness of judge-made regulatory measures
governing adhesion contracts;"s (3) providing incentives for insurers to
clarify language and bring limiting provisions to the attention of in-
sureds; 15  (4) the superiority of the reasonable expectations doctrine as
opposed to straining contra proferentem in the manner then being applied by
the courts;"s (5) filling in the gaps unprotected by the traditional mistake
doctrines of estoppel and unconscionability.1 s7
5. Inter-Jurisdictional Acceptance of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
The concept of honoring reasonable expectations spread to jurisdictions
which had not already applied the principle in one form or another. A
thorough 1990 study by Professor Roger Henderson 58 catalogued sixteen
states applying the concept in different forms, ten of which hinted possibly
at adopting the "strong" Keeton formulation.'" The remaining six states
appeared to embrace the theory although there were indications that their
laws were still in flux.1"' Nine states expressly"' declined to apply the
doctrine, out of which one state expressed definite non-compliance,16 and
ble advantages. Id. at 974. See Rahdert, supra note 115, at 33842 (explaining the
unconscionability rationale). Rahdert observes three basic justifications for setting insurance
contracts apart from "ordinary" contracts: (1) adhesion, (2) unconscionability, and (3) estoppel.
Id. at 33645.
154. State regulation of the insurance industry is relatively weak, and even when regulation
of contract language exists, insurers can merely accept or reject the same words proposed by the
insurer verbatim or with moderate alterations. Keeton, supra note 21, at 967. "The history of
insurance cases ...is ...replete with instances of judicially created regulatory doctrines.
Court-made doctrines are particularly pervasive in the area of rights at variance." Id. at 964
n.4. Professor Rahdert similarly noted the ineffectiveness of administrative regulatory entities
and legislatures to control abuse of insurance contract fine print. Rahdert, supra note 115, at
341-42.
155. Keeton is careful to explain that his proposed doctrine affords the insurer an opportunity
to bring explicit and unambiguous contract limitations to the attention of the insured and negate
surprise. Keeton, supra note 21 at 968.
156. The earlier use of contra proferentem exhibited a tendency of going beyond the mandates
of the venerable doctrine resulting in its perversion through fusion with otherwise distinct
principles like unconscionability (basis for decision in Henningsen treated supra part I.C.2.) and
detrimental reliance. See Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 394 P.2d 571, 576-78 (Cal. 1964).
Not only are the interests of doctrinal purity offended, but such applications result in confusion
as well as notions of uncontrolled judicial activism undermining the credibility of the courts.
Keeton also noticed a disturbing tendency of the courts to create ambiguities where none existed
in order to implement equity and imbue the result contradictory to traditional precepts with
quasi-legitimacy. Keeton, supra note 21, at 972.
157. Keeton, supra note 21, at 973-77.
158. Henderson, supra note 16.
159. These were: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, and New Jersey. Id. at 828.
160. Pennsylvania, Hawaii, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Colorado. Id. at
829-34.
161. Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 834-35 n.68.
162. Idaho. Id. at 834.
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one state expressed interest.'" Henderson concluded that the concept of
honoring reasonable expectations was no longer an "emerging doctrine"
anymore, but had come to its own as a full-fledged and flourishing
doctrine1" with a substantial probability of expanding its jurisdictional
reach further.'" Henderson, who identified California as a "strong"
Keeton state was right." However, the California rule which predated the
Keeton article also embraced the "weak" Keeton formula. This was
established in California law by the alternative holding in Gray v. Zu-
rich.167
I. APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE: GRAY V.
ZURICH, ITS PROGENY, AND THE TRIUMPH OF SUBSTANCE OVER FORM
A. The Gray Court Establishes the Primacy of the
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine in California
Although courts have long followed the basic precept that they would look
to the words of the contract to find the meaning which the parties expected
from them, they have also applied the doctrine of the adhesion contract to
insurance policies, holding that in view of the disparate bargaining status
of the parties we must ascertain the meaning of the contract which the
insured would reasonably expect. 1"'
With these words, Gray v. Zurich established the primacy of the reasonable
expectations doctrine in California's law governing the interpretation of
insurance contracts during the last two decades."6  The basic principle
espoused by Gray continued the Steven court's efforts at distancing insurance
contract interpretation rules from orthodox contract law precepts, and
effectively severed insurance policies from traditional contract construction
concepts.
163. Massachusetts. Id. at 835.
164. Id. at 834. Henderson differentiated the "strong" and "weak" forms of Keeton's
reasonable expectations doctrine in this manner: the weak form, requiring an ambiguity for
application is an extension of contra proferentem and is thus a mere rule of contract
construction; the strong emanation of the Keeton formula represents a distinct and legitimate
doctrine. Id. at 827.
165. Id. at 834. Contra Rahdert, supra note 115, at 324. A mere six years earlier, Professor
Rahdert observed that the initial appeal of the doctrine was beginning to fade.
166. See supra text accompanying note 148.
167. The Gray opinion initially analyzed the location and obtuseness of the limiting provision
in the insurance policy and held that such gave rise to reasonable expectations of coverage. In
the alternative, the court held that the language of the limiting provision was itself ambiguous
and as such should be construed against the insurer in light of the reasonable expectations of the
insured. The latter holding was adopted subsequently by the California Supreme Court. See
infra part II.B. 1.
168. Gray, 419 P.2d at 171-72 (citations omitted).
169. This language (reflecting a "strong" Keeton formulation) was later discredited by the
California Supreme Court in Herzog v. National Am. Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 841 (Cal. 1970).
Herzog is treated briefly infra parts II.B.1. & II.B.3.
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Although the decision was not universally lauded,1" Gray's reason-
able expectations doctrine brought order to insurance contract interpretation
in California by proposing a single dominant principle as opposed to the
wide array of axioms previously used by the courts. 172 Gray was seen as
a landmark case for two reasons: (1) it set a new standard for insurance
contract interpretation, and (2) it delineated the scope of an insurer's duty to
defend."7 The influence of Gray was extended beyond application to
insurance policy coverage disputes in CaliforniaW174 and has been cited
extensively in other jurisdictions. 75
1. The Facts Facing the Gray Court
The dispute in Gray arose out of a fist fight between Dr. Vernon Gray
and one John R. Jones which resulted from a near collision of their two
vehicles. 76 Jones sued for assault while Gray maintained he acted in self-
defense."7  Gray was insured by the Zurich Insurance Company which
under a "Comprehensive Personal Liability Endorsement" promised coverage
for sums which Gray would become legally obligated to pay as damages
resulting from bodily injury or property damages and provided for a legal
170. See e.g., Mayhew, supra note 12, at 276, 281 (describing Gray holding as "illogical" and
based upon "faulty reasoning").
171. Many critics observe certain applications of the reasonable expectations doctrine as
resulting in unpredictability and confusion. See id. at 269, 270; Rahdert, supra note 115, at
329, 371.
172. Gray was decided four years before Keeton's seminal article (discussed supra in part
I.C.4.) proposed to lend legitimacy to disparate court rationales.
173. Cf Duty to Defend Made Absolute, supra note 4, at 1335 (noting that the scope of the
duty to defend was "not clearly articulated"). The present work does not treat the duty to
defend issue in great detail but addresses the issue only collaterally to the reasonable expectations
doctrine. For detailed analyses on Gray's influence and the duty to defend issue, see Sampson
A. Brown & John L. Romaker, Cumis, Conflicts and the Civil Code: Section 2860 Changes
Little, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 45 (1988); Donald F. Farbstein & Francis J. Stillman, Insurancefor the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1219 (1969). See generally Duty to
Defend Made Absolute, supra note 4.
174. See e.g., Richard C. Maxwell, The Due-on-Sale Clause: Restraints on Alienation and
Adhesion Theory in California 28 UCLA L. REV. 197 (1980) (acceleration of secured loans upon
sale of real property serving as security); James R. McCall, Due Process and Consumer
Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance-Repossession and Adhesion
Contract Issues, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 383 (1974) (oppressive repossession clauses); Barbara B.
Rintala, California's Anti-Deficiency Legislation and Suretyship Law: The Transversion of
Protective Statutory Schemes, 17 UCLA L. REV. 245 (1969) (anti-deficiency and suretyship
law); Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981)(waiver); Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long As Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth "-How Long A 77me
Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975) (Native American treaty rights); Elizabeth P. Allor,
Note, Keating v. Superior Court: Opressive [sic] Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 71
CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1983) (application to arbitration clauses in relation to class actions).
175. See e.g., supra note 13.
176. Gray, 419 P.2d at 170 n.1.
177. Id. Apparently, after the near mishap Jones approached Gray's automobile and opened
its door; Gray then got up and struck Jones. Id.
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defense upon such allegations against Gray even if such charges were
"groundless, false, or fraudulent." 78 Under exclusion "c" of the policy,
Zurich excepted coverage for "bodily injury or property damages caused
intentionally by... the insured." 79
Gray requested Zurich to defend him and Zurich refused to do so on the
basis of exclusion "c." S  Gray paid for his own defense and lost the
case.18 However, the jury did not award punitive damages to Jones. 11
Gray sued Zurich for breach of its contractual duty to defend him.m
Zurich responded by disclaiming liability on three grounds: (1) On its face,
the Jones complaint did not allege any basis for which Zurich provided
coverage since the policy specifically excluded bodily injuries caused by the
insured's intentional acts, (2) providing coverage would violate public policy,
and (3) if Zurich defended, it would be embroiled in a conflict of inter-
est. 1
2. The Two Alternate Theories for Recovery Proposed by the Gray Court
The Gray Court found coverage under two alternative analyses. The
first inquiry relied upon location and conspicuousness of the limiting
provisions as the crucial points of analysis. The second test stressed
ambiguity.
Initially, the opinion did not seem to place primary significance on
ambiguity, merely noting that the intentional acts exclusion was not
"conspicuous, plain, and clear";" the exclusion occupied an inconspicuous
location in the policy; contained obscure language and was scored in fine
print and it followed language purporting to provide broad protection, which
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. This fact is noteworthy since the complaint against Gray alleged intentional conduct
and only compensatory damages were awarded by the jury. As discussed infra, this tends to
bolster the court's observation that the reasonable layperson equates "intentional" conduct with
acts having an element of ill will.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 170-71. The discussion in this study relates to the first contention only. The public
policy and conflict of interest arguments are best left to other works. See Brown & Romaker,
supra note 173 (discussing public policy and conflict of interest issues surrounding the insurer's
duty to defend in California).
185. Id. at 174 (citing Steven).
[Vol. 29
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gave rise to a reasonable expectation of coverage.186 Since the insured had
a reasonable expectation of coverage, his expectation was to be honored."8
In the alternative,' the text's emphasis then shifted to highlight an
observation that the language of the exclusionary clause itself was ambiguous
since the layman could reasonably interpret the term "intentional" to mean
"planned" or "wilful" rather than the tort notion of intent.'" As a result,
the court noted that:
The insured is unhappily surrounded by concentric circles of uncertainty:
the first, the unascertainable nature of the insurer's duty to defend; the
second, the unknown effect of the provision that the insurer must defend
even a groundless, false, or fraudulent claim; the third, the uncertain extent
of the indemnification coverage.'9°
The court then opined that such uncertainties must be resolved in favor
of the insured and the language interpreted "according to the layman's
reasonable expectations."' 91 This alternate analysis emphasized the con-
sumer's reasonable expectations based upon the existence of an ambiguity in
the insurance contract. Resolving uncertainties to protect the consumer's
reasonable expectations became the cornerstone of California insurance law.
3. The Factors Affecting Expectations
The broad coverage clauses relating to the insurer's promise to defend
and indemnify the insured were held out in an endorsement purporting to be
a "Comprehensive Personal Liability Policy" and expressly provided for the
contingency of false, groundless, or fraudulent suits.9 This created a
186. Id. at 173-74. This rationale would lead one to conclude that an ambiguity is not really
necessary for the doctrine of reasonable expectations to kick in. Both Steven and Gray flirted
with this rationale, but as the subsequent case law will reveal infra, the California Supreme
Court would later adopt the second rationale herein which would require an ambiguity to exist
before honoring the insured's reasonable expectations.
187. Id. at 171 ("Since the policy sets forth the duty to defend . . . and since the insurer
attempts to avoid it only by an unclear exclusionary clause, the insured would reasonably expect,
and is legally entitled to, such protection.").
188. It is important to note that the Gray court made its primary holding based solely upon the
reasonable expectations of the insured. Id. at 171-72. However, the Gray court itself
emphasized the secondary importance of the remainder of the opinion as "an alternative but
secondary ground for our ruling." Id. at 171.
189. Id. at 174.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 174-75. On this note, Justice Tobriner defined the role of reasonable expectations
which he left unspecified in Steven. Although similar to traditional contra proferentem because
of the notion of construing ambiguities against the insurer, the rule here specified by the court
is remarkably different for injecting the requirement that the contract terms be read in
accordance with reasonable expectations. Previous to Steven and Gray, construing ambiguities
against the insurer meant a per se determination against the insurer regardless of reasonable
expectations. See Gaunt, 160 F.2d at 601 (holding that ambiguities be interpreted colloquially
in the manner of the person unacquainted with the "niceties" of insurance).
192. Gray, 419 P.2d at 173.
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reasonable expectation in Gray (or any layman for that matter) that the
insurer would defend any suit whether resulting from intentional, negligent,
or non-intentional conduct."r Furthermore, the obligation to defend was
found to be ambiguous since the condition giving rise to such a duty
(determination of non-intentional conduct) could only be resolved at the end
of the lawsuit in which the insurer would have had to defend the insured. 94
Because such expectations would have reasonably developed under the
circumstances, and the scope of the duty was ill-defined, it was incumbent
upon Zurich to make any limitations affecting those expectations, as well as
the scope of the duty clear and conspicuous, or risk an interpretation in
conformance with the insured's reasonable expectations. 95
The court carefully declared that only expectations which are reasonable
are to be rewarded. 19 Furthermore, the opinion clearly limited the
insured's reasonable expectations to those embracing the nature and kind of
damage insured against."9 Since then, Courts have found many insured's
expectations to be unreasonable. 198 For example: A homeowner's policy
which includes coverage of auto-related accidents which occur on ways
adjoining the insured's property cannot propagate a reasonable expectation
of coverage for an automobile accident occurring away from the premises in
the same manner that an automobile insurance policy would. 1 9
Through Gray, the California Supreme Court manifested Justice
Tobriner's sensitivity to the plight of the consumer who increasingly entered
into standardized agreements with more economically powerful entities.'
193. Id. at 174.
194. Id. at 173. "Ihe insured would reasonably expect a defense by the insurer in all
pfersonal injury actions against him. If he is required to finance his own defense and then, only
if successful, hold the insurer to its promise by means of a second suit for reimbursement, we
defeat the basic reason for the purchase of insurance." Id. at 178.
195. Id. at 174 (citing Steven).
196. Id. at 175.
197. Id.
198. The "nature" limitation applies to the type of damage insured against. For example,
where a policy promises protection for bodily injury, property damage, and personal injury,
lawsuits seeking these types of damages are presumptively covered. The "kind" limitation
applies to the type of insurance provided, i.e., Business Insurance, Homeowners Insurance, Auto
Insurance, Errors and Omissions Insurance. See discussion of Herzog v. Nat'l. Am. Ins. Co.
infra at Part II.B.3.
199. These were the facts controlling the decision in Herzog, 465 P.2d 841 (Cal. 1970).
200. Gray, 419 P.2d at 171-72. As Justice Tobriner later explained in his Retrospect essay,
the law had to make allowances for the demise of freely bargained contracts brought on by the
mass standardized contract in today's "standardized society." Tobriner, supra note 94, at 7.
The more powerful party, who is more able to take the loss, controls the language of the policy
thus relegating the consumer to a position of complete dependency. Id. Tobriner compared the
doctrine in Gray with the law governing products liability and submitted that just as the
reasonable expectations of the buyer for the safety of the product are honored, so too should the
reasonable expectations of the policyholder about coverage under the policy be respected. Id.
Kessler noted the importance of standard contracts to business enterprises as: (1) a method of
controlling the effects of the "irrational factor" in litigation and (2) controlling and regulating
the flow of goods from manufacturer, to distributor, all the way to the consumer. Kessler, supra
note 59, at 632. Standardized contracts reflect society's need for predictability in the judicial
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Gray's quotations from Isaacs, and Pound"' revealed the tendency of
standardized contracts to create status (not contractual) relationships directly
opposing freedom of contract, thus justifying removal of such adhesive
agreements from traditional contracts law.' The end result was a status-
based approach to determine the responsibilities of the insurance compa-
ny-' If the status relationship is found to be adhesive, the contract is
interpreted based upon what the weaker party reasonably expects "according
to the enterpriser's 'calling.'" '
The Gray Court made it clear that insurance contracts were contracts of
adhesion which were to be construed differently from other contracts in
California. The opinion was a signal to California judges that they were to
protect the reasonable expectations of the insurance consumer.
The California Supreme Court developed two ways for the courts below
to protect the expectations of the insurance policyholder. One embodied a
strong formulation of the reasonable expectations doctrine, providing that if
the reasonable consumer would expect coverage-he got it. The other was
a weaker version of the reasonable expectations doctrine which protected the
consumer's reasonable expectations anytime the policy proved ambiguous.
The latter tool became the dominant law of California.'
B. Post-Gray Application of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
The reasonable expectations doctrine first pronounced by Gray v. Zurich
evolved over subsequent years into a primary interpretive doctrine governing
judicial construction of all insurance policies. The doctrine's scope was
refined through subsequent court decisions. Such refinement gave rise to the
following operative requirements: (1) The contract language must give rise
to an ambiguity before the doctrine can be invoked, (2) the expectations
derived from such ambiguities must be reasonable, and (3) the doctrine does
not apply in cases involving "sophisticated insureds" who bargain for
particularized contract terms.
process. Id. See Keeton, supra note 21, at 963 (recognizing the danger of lopsided agreements
resulting in unconscionable overreaching by the stronger bargaining party).
201. Gray, 419 P.2d at 171 n.6.
202. The principle of freedom of contract was instrumental in tearing down the old feudalist
order governed by status relationships. Kessler, supra note 59, at 641. Because the propensity
of free-rein capitalism has been towards the formation of monopolies, the playing field had to
be leveled, so to speak, in order to protect consumers from the oppression of the business
establishment wielding powers even more awesome than the old feudal lords. Id. at 640-41.
Because of his status, the consumer in a society dominated by big business, does not have the
power to negotiate or bargain with the larger entity whose chief weapon is the standardized
contract. The courts returned to status-based classifications precisely to protect the consumer's
freedom of contract. Id. at 640.
203. Id. at 641. See Tobriner, supra note 94, at 8.
204. Gray, 419 P.2d at 172 (quoting Kessler, supra note 59, at 637).
205. Implied by the holding in Herzog, 465 P.2d at 844.
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1. There Must Be An Ambiguity Before the Contra-Insurer Rules Apply
The purpose of judicial construction of contract terms is to ascertain the
mutual expectation of the parties.' In the construction of insurance
policies, the crucial analysis involves determining ambiguity in the con-
tract.) An insurance contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of
two or more reasonable interpretations.l 8 But if there is no ambiguity in
the contract provisions, the contract terms will be enforced exactly as ex-
pressed." Absent extrinsic evidence, interpretation of contract terms is
a question of law.210
The interpretation rules which require construction against the insurer do
not apply in the absence of ambiguity. The First District Court of Appeals
stated thus:
[The] rule requiring all uncertainties, ambiguities, inconsistencies and
doubtful provisions to be resolved against the insurer and in favor of the
insured is subject to the important limitation... that it is applicable only
when the policy actually presents such uncertainty, ambiguity, inconsisten-
cy or doubt. In the absence thereof, the courts .. .give effect to the
contract of insurance as executed by the parties.21'
In Herzog v. National American Insurance Company, the California
Supreme Court implicitly adopted the alternative holding of Gray which
required the presence of an ambiguity in the contract provisions before the
court resorts to an interpretation which takes account of the reasonable
expectations of the insured. The homeowner's insurance policy provi-
sion in Herzog expressly excluded coverage for auto accidents occurring
"away from the [policyholder's] premises or the ways immediately adjoin-
ing."213
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. c (1979).
207. Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d at 924-25. Ascertainment
of the ambiguity entails an analysis of extrinsic evidence pertaining to the mutual intent of the
parties. BARRY R. OsTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DISPUTES §101[b] (4th ed. 1991). See Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785, 786 (Cal.
1968) (stating that admissibility of extrinsic evidence is tested by its tendency to show a
reasonable interpretation of the language in contention).
208, Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
209. 2 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 15:10 (Ronald A. Anderson
ed., Mark S. Rhodes rev. vol. 2d ed. 1984).
210. Aorojet-General Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior Court (Cheshire & Cos.), 257 Cal.
Rptr. 621, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. I Dist. 1989), reh'g denied, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684 (Cal. Ct. App.
I Dist. 1989), and review denied, 1989 Cal. LEXIS 4071 (Cal. 1989). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(2) cmt. d (1979).
211. Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 231, 234 (Cal. Ct. App. I Dist. 1962).
212. This formulation predated and accords with the "weak Keeton" reasonable expectations
doctrine. See supra part I.C.4.
213. Herzog, 465 P.2d at 842.
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The court held that although the policy language may have been "impre-
cise," the intent to geographically limit coverage was clear enough to provide
a rational definition under the circumstances." 4 Provisions found to be
ambiguous under a certain set of facts may not be ambiguous in other
situations. 215  As a result, the provision in question was not construed
against the insurer.216
2. Clearly Drafted Insurance Policy Language Obviates the
Need for a Reasonable Expectations Analysis
The Gray rationale imposed a duty upon insurers to draft policy language
with great clarity in order to escape the consequences of the reasonable
expectations doctrine. For example, in Insurance Company of North America
v. Sam Harris Construction Company, Inc.,217 the insured possessed a
liability and indemnity policy which purported to cover property damage and
bodily injury arising out of maintenance of its aircraft.1 Relevant "policy
period" language indicated that the policy covered "accidents or occurrences"
transpiring during the policy period listed as September 3, 1971 to July 1,
1972.219 The insured sold the aircraft and canceled the policy, but was
sued thereafter by the buyer for negligent maintenance of the aircraft when
the plane crashed after the sale.' ° The insured requested the insurer to
defend against the claim." The insurer sued the insured for declaratory
relief to determine its rights and liabilities under the policy.tm
The insurance company asserted non-coverage because the event causing
the injury happened outside the covered policy period. The court construed
the term "occurrences or accidents" to be ambiguous.' Interpreting the
terms in accordance with the insured's reasonable expectations, the court
determined that the provision "occurrences or accidents" signified a choice
of alternatives as opposed to a synonymous relationship. m The high court
then contended that it was reasonable for the insured to assume that the
214. Id. at 844.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 843. See II.B.3 infra.
217. 583 P.2d 1335 (Cal. 1978).
218. Id. at 1336.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1336-37.
224. Id. at 1336-37. Thus, the policy would cover either (1) accidents, as a separate category
of events from occurrences, or (2) occurrences which entailed a whole different set of incidents.
The court opposed the insurer's construction equating "occurrences or accidents" to define a
single event giving immediate rise to the injury for which the claim related. Id.
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policy covered "occurrences" '  as well as "accidents" during the policy
period.? The negligent maintenance could reasonably be regarded as an
"occurrence" under the policy terms and the negligent act occurred during
the relevant period. ' 7 To protect the consumer's reasonable expectations,
the court held that the insurer was obligated to defend the suit.'
The opinion noted that the same terminology was held unambiguous in
two previous cases.' However, those cases were distinguished from the
present case because the insurers in the earlier cases were careful to define
"occurrence" as "an accident causing injury during the policy period."'
Encouraging clarity in insurance contract language remained one of the
important policies supported by the reasonable expectations doctrine. 3
3. The Expectations Must Be Reasonable
California's hybrid formula retained the requirement that an ambiguity
exist before the contra-insurer rule applies, 2 but the policy is then
construed in light of the insured's reasonable expectations 33 The addition-
al requirement that the policyholder have reasonable expectations that arise
because of ambiguous terms, strikes a balance between traditional contra
proferentem' and the "strong" Keeton reasonable expectations doc-
trine. 5 As Keeton noted:
[I]t might be objected that resolving ambiguities against the insurer would
sometimes be more favorable to the insured than would honoring reason-
able expectations. For example, even though the contractual language was
ambiguous, there might have been no expectation at all, or the expectation
225. The court used the Webster's definition for "occurrence" as "the general word for
anything that happens or takes place." Id. at 1337.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.. at 1336. The cases were: Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 295 P.2d 19 (Cal.
1956) and Tijsselling v. General Ace. & Life Assur. Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Cal. Ct. App.
1 Dist. 1976). Sam Harris, 583 P.2d at 1336.
230. Sam Harris, 583 P.2d at 1336.
231. Justice Tobriner so picturesquely stated as a prologue to his opinion in Bareno v.
Employers Life Insurance Co. that: "On countless occasions we have inveighed against the
careless draftsmanship of documents of insurance and have decried the evil social consequences
that flow from lack of clarity. We have emphasized that the uncertain clause leaves in its murky
wake not only the disillusioned insured and the protesting insurer but also the anguished court."
500 P.2d at 890 (citations omitted).
232. Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
233. Sam Harris, 583 P.2d at 1336; 2 COUCH, supra note 209, § 15:16.
234. Contra proferentem had developed from a last resort interpretational device to a per se
rule requiring construction against the insurer. Miller, supra note 12, at 1852.
235. No ambiguity is required under a strong Keeton analysis. See supra note 144 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 29
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might be unreasonable, thus defeating a claimed expansion of coverage
beyond the letter of the contract.?3
Gray v. Zurich defined the limits of reasonable expectations to those that
fell within the nature and kind of protection which the insurer held out to
provide.3 7 Herzog again provides a classic example. There the insured
asserted that the language of her homeowner's policy gave rise to reasonable
expectation of coverage for an auto accident which occurred at a location
away from the home.3 Nonetheless, the court found the insured's
expectations unreasonable, 9 because (1) the type of information sought in
an application for homeowner's insurance is very different from that required
in an automotive policy, (2) an insignificant premium was charged (which
coincides with the lesser risk imposed upon the insurer in providing
homeowner's coverage), and (3) there was separate availability of automobile
insurance policies. Accordingly, no reasonable expectation could have arisen
that the homeowner's policy in question covered automobile accidents away
from the insured's premises.' In accordance with Gray, coverage for
automobile accidents away from the insured premises did not fall into the
nature and kind of insurance proffered by the insurer.
4. The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine Does not Apply to Cases
Involving "Sophisticated" Insureds or When There is Sufficient
Bargaining Between the Parties Over Particularized Terms
It is also relevant for the court to analyze the relative bargaining
strengths of the contracting parties."4 Contract terms are presumed
enforceable unless the contesting party can show that the agreement is an
236. Keeton, supra note 21, at 969.
237. 419 P.2d at 175.
238. The insured reasoned that coverage by the policy of automobile-related accidents on the
premises or on "ways immediately adjoining" such converted the subject policy into a motor
vehicle liability policy which is subject to all statutory law applicable to the motor vehicle
liability insurance. Herzog, 465 P.2d at 842. One motor vehicle statute mandated that auto
insurance cover the entire continental United States. Id. As a result, according to the insured,
the geographic limitation imposed by the policy was void and therefore, the insurance policy
should cover the accident which occurred away from and not within an area immediately
adjoining the home. Id.
239. Id. at 843.
240. Id. See Producers Dairy Delivery, 718 P.2d at 925 ("[A] finding of ambiguity in policy
language cannot be based on an unreasonable misunderstanding on the part of the insured.").
The Fourth District Appeals Court similarly stressed that actionable expectations that arise from
policy language must be reasonable. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Eanes, 184 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (Cal.
Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1982) (commenting that the reasonable expectations doctrine is not an
"authorization to ignore common sense." Id. See also Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Moskopoulos,
172 Cal. Rptr. 248, 252 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1981); Hover v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 138 Cal. Rptr. 646, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1977).
241. Gray, 419 P.2d at 171-72.
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unenforceable adhesion contract. u2 If the contract is found to be an
adhesion contract, its meaning is ascertained in light of the insured's
reasonable expectations.3' The very foundation that the reasonable
expectations doctrine builds upon is the adhesion contract theory which
developed as a judicial reaction to agreements reached absent any significant
bargaining between the stronger and weaker parties to the contract. Where
there is sufficient negotiating between the parties to the contract, or both
parties are equally powerful bargaining entities, the reasonable expectations
doctrine does not apply."
Thus, in Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,'5 the California
Supreme Court refused to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine since
the policy held by the insured was the product of bargaining between the
powerful State Employees Retirement System's Board of Administration and
the insurer.' In explaining why the adhesion doctrine did not apply in
this case, the court stated:
[The policy] represents the product of negotiation between two parties,
Kaiser and the board, possessing parity of bargaining strength. . . [the
board] exerted its bargaining strength to secure medical protection for
employees on more favorable terms than any employee could individually
obtain.
247
This rule was reconfirmed eight years later in Garcia v. Truck Insurance Ex-
change' when the court similarly declined to apply a reasonable expecta-
tions analysis of a hospital's malpractice insurance policy which was the
product of joint drafting and individualized negotiations between the carrier
and the influential California Hospitals Association.' 9 The same rationale
242. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d at 172; 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 559H, at 367 (Supp. 1992). Contra, Rakoff, supra note 26 (arguing main thesis
that adhesion contracts should be presumed invalid unless proven otherwise).
243. Gray, 419 P.2d at 171-72.
244. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (FMC Corp.), 799 P.2d at 1265 ("[W]here the
policyholder does not suffer from lack of ... bargaining power, and where it is clear that an
imurane policy was actually negotiated and jointly drafted, we need not go so far in protecting
the insured from ambiguous or highly technical drafting"). Contra Curtis M. Caton, Wondie
Russell, & Barry S. Levin, The Rules of Insurance Policy Construction and the Myth of the
"Sophisticated Insured," 385 PRACTICING L. INST./LITIG. 9 (1990).
245. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976). Madden was another Tobriner opinion.
246. Id. at 1185.
247. Id.
248. 682 P.2d 1100 (Cal. 1984). The plaintiff in Garcia sought medical malpractice proceeds
from a hospital's malpractice carrier based upon a stipulated judgement between herself and the
defendant hospital staff surgeon in the underlying case. Id. at 1102. The carrier denied
coverage based upon exclusionary language exempting coverage when the physician is privately
employed by the injured party. Id. at 1103. The court found that the injury arose from such
an occasion. Id.
249. Id.
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was used by the court in holding that the reasonable expectations doctrine did
not apply to reinsurance coverage disputes which involve two insurers.'
5. The Gray Doctrine's Scope of Application
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, California courts remained bent on
honoring the insurance consumer's reasonable expectations of coverage in
policy disputes involving the various types of insurance available on the
market. The reasonable expectations doctrine was applied to coverage
disputes involving varied types of coverage: title insurance,25 group life
insurance 2  and disability policies, 3  aircraft,2 watercraft,2 5  and
automobile' liability policies, professional liability policies,' and
construction insurance."' Standardized exclusion provisions such as the
products hazard exclusion, 9 business pursuit exclusion,' intoxication
and felony exclusions in life insurance policies," pilot or crew member
exclusions in aircraft liability policies, 2 and family member exclusions in
watercraft liability policies,' as well as other limiting provisions,'
were all construed in light of the insured's reasonable expectations of cover-
age.' Federal Courts in the Sixth,' Ninth, 7 and Tenthl Circuits
250. See Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 612 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1980).
251. Paramount Properties Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 463 P.2d 746 (Cal. 1970).
252. Bareno v. Employers Life Ins. Co. of Wausau, 500 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1972).
253. Williams v. American Casulty Co. of Reading, Pa., 491 P.2d 398 (Cal. 1971).
254. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 551 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1976).
255. Harris v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 493 P.2d 861 (Cal. 1972).
256. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1969).
257. Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 514 P.2d 1219 (Cal. 1973).
258. Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 375
(Cal. Ct. App. I Dist. 1977).
259. Hays v. Pac. Indem. Group, 86 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 3 Dist. 1970).
260. Wint v. Fidelity & Casulty Co. of N.Y., 507 P.2d 1383 (Cal. 1973).
261. Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist.
1974).
262. Castro v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist.
1988), review denied, (Mar. 29, 1989).
263. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1982).
264. Jauregui v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 3 Dist. 1991),
review denied, 199 Cal. LEXIS 1632 (Cal. 1992) (limiting provision to insure liability only to
extent required by Financial Responsibility law invalidated). Coverage provisions are also
subject to the reasonable expectations doctrine. See Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 482 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1971) (liberal construction of Banker's Blanket Bond which insures
banks against losses from loans approved based upon documents later found to be counterfeit).
265. Far from being aper se contra-insurer rule, courts utilizing the reasonable expectations
doctrine held true to limiting coverage only for those cases where the expectations are
reasonable. See Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920, 925 (Cal.
1986) (holding that employer could not have reasonable expectation that its workmen's
compensation insurance covered an injury to a non-employee).
33
Romaker and Prieto: Expectations Lost: Bank of the West v. Superior Court Places the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
116 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
have also used the reasonable expectations doctrine in insurance coverage
disputes. For the meantime, there appeared to be no clear danger of eroding
the reasonable expectations doctrine in California.
III. EXPECTATIONS LOST
Long before Gray, it was uncontested that insurance contracts were just
contracts warranting no special contract construction rules.' Subsequent-
ly, the courts manipulated contra proferentem and other contract interpreta-
tion doctrines to provide better protection for the insurance consumer.'
Then came Gray v. Zurich. As noted above, Gray established that insurance
contracts are special contracts which require different interpretive rules from
those applied to other contracts 1  For twenty five years, the California
Supreme Court analyzed insurance policies under the dictates of the special
doctrine of reasonable expectations.' Insurance policies were authorita-
266. See Lebow Associates, Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 439 F.Supp. 1288 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(finding that insurer was obligated to defend underlying claim when limiting provision to exclude
occurrences outside of employment was ambiguous and gave rise to reasonable expectations of
coverage).
267. See Aetna Casulty & Surety Co. v. Trans World Assur. Co., 745 F.Supp. 1524 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (Company charged with fraudulent tax practices sought indemnity and defense from
insurer; the court did not apply broad statutory definition of "unfair competition" because the
underlying claim did not allege statutory unfair competition under § 17200 of the Business and
Professions Code; see also infra Part III.B. which details the Bank of the West decision relating
to the same "unfair competition" provision); Healy Tibbitts Const. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co.,
482 F.Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding there would have been a duty to defend in light of
reasonable expectations had the language been less clear, but the policy provision at issue
unambiguously provided for a right of the insured to take over the lawsuit, not a duty to defend
such); Price v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., Ltd., 616 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. Cal. 1980) (providing
coverage under Comprehensive General Liability policy for suit filed by longshoremen against
shipowner-insured); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Weiner 606 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. Cal.
1979) (finding that exclusion of claims involving criminal conviction was ambiguous and should
be read in light of insured's reasonable expectations).
268. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. International Mfg. Co., 641 F.Supp. 733 (D. Wyo. 1986)(providing coverage after the policy period elapsed when "occurrences" language in policy
providing coverage for the manufacture of insured's product during the relevant policy period
was ambiguous and could have given rise to reasonable expectations of coverage).
269. See Yoch v. Home Mut. Ins. Co. 44 P. 189, 189 (Cal. 1896); Wells, Fargo & Co. v.
Pac. Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 397, 406-07 (1872).
270. See supra Parts I.A. & I.B.
271. See supra text accompanying note 167.
272. See AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (FMC Corp.), 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990); Producers
Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1986); White v. Weste4in Title Ins.
Co., 710 P.2d 309 (Cal. 1985), reh'g denied, (Feb. 14, 1986); Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co.,
696 P.2d 1308 (Cal. 1985); Gareia v. Truck Ins. Exch., 682 P.2d 1100 (Cal. 1984); Reserve
Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764 (Cal. 1982); Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 636 P.2d
32 (Cal. 1981); Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 612 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1980); Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 1335 (Cal. 1978); National Ins. Underwriters v.
Carter, 551 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1976); Holz Rubber Co. v. American Star Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 1055(Cal. 1975); Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 514 P.2d 1219 (Cal. 1973); State Farm Mut. Anto. Ins.
Co. v. Jacober, 514 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1973); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514
P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973); Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 513 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1973);
Wint v. Fidelity & Casulty Co. of N.Y., 507 P.2d 1383 (Cal. 1973); Bareno v. Employers Life
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tively interpreted under the protective eye of Gray and its progeny. The
focus of the analysis turned upon the existence of ambiguities in the contract
and the resolution of such to promote the reasonable expectations of the
insurance consumer. Most importantly, insurance contracts were read
through the eyes of the reasonable consumer as a layperson.' The focus
of the analysis was consistently based upon whether a reasonable consumer
could read the policy in such a manner as to require coverage. If so,
coverage was provided by the courts.
A. The Move to Limit the Reach of Gray
1. The Intrusion of the California Civil Code
into the Interpretive Equation
With two opinions, 4 the Lucas Court undid twenty-five years of law.
Ignoring the principle which declared insurance contracts to be subject to
different rules of construction, 5 the court treated insurance policies as
ordinary contracts by applying the general rules of contract interpretation 76
found in the California Civil Code. The varied doctrines long used by the
courts to protect reasonable consumer expectations were scrapped by simply
adding an extra step to the insurance contract analysis. That step is
embodied in the California Civil Code section 164927 (hereinafter referred
to as "section 1649"). This dramatic change stems from the California
Supreme Court's adoption of traditional contract interpretation law in place
of the special rules rationalized by the adhesion contract doctrine.
Ins. Co. of Wausau, 500 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1972); Harris v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 493 P.2d 861
(Cal. 1972); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 492 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1972); Williams
v. American Casulty Co. of Reading, Pa., 491 P.2d 398 (Cal. 1971); Crane v. State Farm Fire
& Casulty Co., 485 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1971); Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
482 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1971); Hogan v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 476 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1970); Herzog
v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 465 P.2d 841 (Cal. 1970); Paramount Properties Co. v. Transamerica
Title Ins. Co., 463 P.2d 746 (Cal. 1970); Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d
674 (Cal. 1969).
273. Piscioua, 640 P.2d at 767.
274. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court (FMC Corp.), 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990).
275. Gray, 419 P.2d at 171-72, 172 n.6.
276. Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 551-52 ("[I]nsurance contracts . . . are still contracts to
which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply.").
277. The Code section reads:
§ 1649. Ambiguity or uncertainty; promise
INTERPRETATION IN SENSE IN WHICH PROMISOR BEUEVED PROMISEE TO RELY. If the
terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted
in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the
i promisee understood it.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1649 (West 1985).
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2. AIU Insurance Co. v. Superior Court Foreshadows
the Doctrinal Transition
Application of the reasonable expectations doctrine was pervasive during
the Gray Era." However, AIU v. Superior Court quietly ushered in a
new era, one which protects the beliefs of the insurance companies rather
than the expectations of insureds. 9  There appeared to be no remarkable
change in the law. Unheralded, and almost unnoticed,' the Lucas Court
subtly changed the equation governing insurance contract interpretation. This
change was then emphasized, but not followed in the Bank of the West
decision.
In AIU, the California Supreme Court was to decide the insurer's
liability under a Comprehensive General Liability policy for response and
cleanup costs incurred by the insured for violation of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act' (hereinafter
CERCLA).? FMC Corporation, the insured real party in interest, was
278. One aberrational Supreme Court decision went against the weight of Gray, however,
Gribaldo, Jacobs, Jones & Associates v. Agrippina Versicherunges A.G., 476 P.2d 406 (Cal.
1970). The court decided the professional liability policy issued to the plaintiff company by the
defendant insurer contained no ambiguities and applied CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778 (which governs
indemnity policies that show no "contrary intent"). Id. at 412-13. The court noted that the
Gray rule must be applied in conjunction with standard practice contract construction. Id. at
410. The court distinguished Gray, however, by noting that Gray was decided without the aid
of extrinsic evidence. Id. at 410 n.5. A strong dissent decried the use of § 2778 because the
three dissenting justices found an ambiguity (id. at 419-20) in the insurance policy which
mandated a reasonable expectations analysis. Id. at 421 ("My interpretation of the defense
duties of Underwriters is indicated not only by the legal construction ... but also by pragmatic
aspects of the parties' relationship" (italics added)). The case had negligible effect on the
strength of the Gray doctrine which was applied vigorously for two decades beyond the Gribaldo
decision.
279. In Bank of the West, Justice Panelli opined that implementation of § 1649 protects the
objectively reasonable expectations of the insured as opposed to the subjective beliefs of the
insurer. 833 P.2d at 552. The discussion in part III.C.3. infra will illustrate that such an
assumption is erroneous.
280. The Sixth District Appellate Court did notice the change. See Aim Ins. Co. v. Culcasi,
280 Cal. Rptr. 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1991), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 2891 (Cal.
1991). The New Jersey Supreme Court declined to follow the result obtained in Culcasi supra.
Voorhecs v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1992). Contrary to the holding of
the California 6th Appellate District, the New Jersey court held that the term "bodily injury"
was ambiguous when related to physical symptoms accompanying emotional distress. Id. at
1261. The ambiguity in Voorhees was resolved in favor of the insured as it was in accordance
with the latter's reasonable expectations of coverage. Id. It appears that the California and New
Jersey courts, once the leading reformers in torts jurisprudence are headed in divergent
directions. The rise of the reasonable expectations doctrine can be attributed to the radical steps
taken by both courts during the early 1960's. New Jersey, as exemplified by the recent
Voorhees case noted above, still adheres to the reasonable expectations doctrine while California
now appears to embrace traditional contract interpretation norms, following the lead of Arizona
and Iowa.
281. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
282. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d at 1253, 1258 (Cal. 1990). For instructive
reading on the varied judicial responses to CERCLA lawsuits, see Howell A. Burkhalter,
Comment, Liability for CERCLA Cleanup Costs-Are Insurers the Victims of Judicial Activism?,
26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221 (1991); Laurence T. Vetter, Note, Law, Equity and the
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sued by the United States and various administrative agencies for violation
of CERCLA because of its alleged contamination of several hazardous waste
sites, the groundwater underneath those sites, surrounding premises, and
nearby surface waters.'
FMC was in possession of over sixty CGL policies issued by several
insurers.' The court's analysis proceeded upon the contention that three
basic elements had to be fulfilled in order to merit insurance coverage:
(1) Complying with the cleanup orders constituted a "legal[] obligation" to
pay, (2) such costs could be considered "damages" and (3) the costs were
incurred because of property damage.' In deciding upon the mode of
interpretation to apply, the court tacitly accepted the fact that insurance
policies are to be construed differently from other contracts.'
The court recognized the adhesive nature of insurance contracts as the
rationale for treating insurance policies differently. 8 Nonetheless, the
Lucas Court inserted the canon of section 1649 as applicable to insurance
contract interpretation.' Absent the unwelcome intrusion (albeit unobtrusive
in this case) of the California Civil Code, AIU's analysis appeared to be a
strong reaffirmation of the reasonable expectations doctrine.'
Chief Justice Lucas' opinion seemed to continue the court's unwavering
resolve to construe the insurance policy terms in the reasonable layman's
point of view. The court agreed with the insurers that CERCLA lawsuits
demanding response costs and injunctive relief are actions in equity." 1
Comprehensive General Liability Policy: The Scope of Coverage for CERCLA Cleanup Costs,
11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 157 (1991); Debi L. Davis, Comment, Insureds Versus Insurers: Litigating
Comprehensive General Liability Policy Coverage in the CERCLA Arena-A Losing Battle for
Both Sides, 43 SW. L.J. 969 (1990).
283. AU, 799 P.2d at 1260.
284. Id. at 1259.
285. Id. at 1261.
286. These three factors were deemed necessary to a finding for coverage in light of the
standard coverage provisions which provided protection for sums that the insured will become
"legally obligated to pay" as a result of "property damages." Id. at 1259. Two of the sixty
policies held by the insured purported to provide protection for sums paid as or for "damages."
Id. All these terms were not defined in the policies. Id.
287. Id. at 1264-65. Although the court catalogued the statutory contract construction rules,
they were referred to as rules of "contract" interpretation. Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). The
court proceeded to enumerate the reasonable expectations rules expounded by Gray and its
progeny as rules applied "[i]n the insurance context." Id. at 1264-65 (emphasis added).
288. The court acknowledged the lack of meaningful negotiations in the insurance contract
formation process and the fact that the insurer, as drafter of the policy, bore the burden of clear
expression of terms. Id. at 1265.
289. "If there is an ambiguity, however, it is resolved by interpreting the ambiguous provision
in the sense the promisor (i.e., the insurer) believed the promisee understood them at the time
of formation." Id. at 1264. It is puzzling why § 1649 was explained since it was not applied
to affect the outcome of the case. Even though the court decided there was an ambiguity in the
contract provisions, there was no § 1649 analysis. Instead, the court went on to decide the case
using the familiar reasonable expectations doctrine.
290. "To the extent that policy language is ambiguous ...our goal remains to protect the
objectively reasonable expectations of the insured." Id. at 1269.
291. Id. at 1266.
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However, the court did not agree that this fact prevented recovery under the
contract even if the policy only covered "damages."' The opinion
explained that the reasonable layperson would not be cognizant of the
distinction between "legal" and "equitable" relief.' In honoring the
reasonable expectations of the policyholder, the plain meaning of the policy
required CERCLA lawsuit costs be considered sums that an insured is
"legally obligated to pay."M
Similarly, the court employed the dictionary definition of "damages"
meaning any pecuniary compensation collected by a third party for an injury
sustained upon him, as opposed to a technical reading of the term which
again related to the distinction between relief provided by courts of law or
equity. 95 The court concluded that the CERCLA clean up costsm and
the costs incurred in compliance with injunctive orders,' were "damages
292. Id. at 1266-67.
293. Id. at 1266. Quoting from an earlier appellate court decision (Aerojet-General Corp. v.
San Mateo County Superior Court (Cheshire & Cos.), 257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist.
1989), reh'g denied, 258 Cal. Rptr. 684 (Cal. Ct. App. I Dist. 1989), and review denied, 4071
Cal. LEXIS (Cal. 1989)), the court commented that an insured would be surprised to discover
that coverage would hinge upon arcane lawyerly distinctions between equitable and legal relief.
Id.
294. Id. at 1267.
295. "Defining 'damages' as sums paid to third persons as a result of 'legal claims' would
render the policy language . . . inconsistent with an ordinary interpretation of the word
damages." Id. at 1268. Chief Justice Lucas evaluated both narrow definitions (sums paid upon
a claim brought in an action at law) and over-broad applications of the term "damages" (any
sum paid out under law or equity for harm brought to another's person or property) and
hesitated to apply either in light of inherent interpretational flaws in both renditions. Id. at 1267-
68. But since CERCLA remedies requiring injunctive relief and compensation for hann to third
parties were used interchangeably, it was decided that application of such remedies created at
least a latent ambiguity and called for the interpretation providing for coverage in favor of the
insured. Id. at 1268-69.
296. Two elements of the plain meaning of "damages" had to be fulfilled: (1) monetary
compensation to the third party as a result of (2) loss or detriment occasioned upon the third
party. Id. at 1267. (1) Even if the United States had no interest in the contaminated property,
it had to undertake cleanup operations which cost money and thus constituted a loss or detriment
satisfying the first element. Id. at 1269. (2) The insured was required to compensate the United
States for the latter's remedial clean up, investigation, and monitoring costs, fulfilling the second
element of "damages." Id. at 1270. The court was not convinced by the insurer's arguments
that CERCLA response are statutorily distinguishable from damages, the sums paid out by the
insured were merely a "cost of doing business," and response costs are restitutionary in nature.
Id. at 1269-75.
297. The court hesitated to equate injunctive relief with a broad definition of "damages"
because compliance with an injunction would require the insured to pay sums to contractors and
employees as opposed to the purported party injured by the insured's actions (the United States).
Id. at 1276. Furthermore, judicial construction of "injunctions" as a sum for which the insured
is legally obligated to pay as damages "because of property damage" is redundant and would
violate the canon of construction requiring a reading of the contract to give effect to every part
of the contract. Id. But again, the opinion emphasized the reasonable expectations of the insured
by stating: "[I]t would exalt form over substance to interpret CGL policies to cover one remedy
but not the other. Given the practical similarity of remedies available under the environmental
statutes at issue here, we believe a reasonable insured would expect both remedies to fall within
coverage as 'damages'." Id. at 1277.
38
California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss1/4
BANK OF = WEST V. SUPERIOR COURT
for which the insured could reasonably have expected coverage under the
policy 95
The court further held that CERCLA response costs and injunctive
remedies imposed upon the insured are costs associated with "property
damage."' The court discounted the argument that the party seeking
recovery had to suffer some form of "harm to a proprietary interest."3
It was enough for the court that "the event precipitating [the] legal action
[was] contamination of property. The costs that result[ed] from such action
[were] therefore incurred 'because of' property damage. " "
AIU was a transitional case. It embodied the reasonable expectations
doctrine of Gray v. Zurich but foreshadowed a doctrinal shift toward
applying traditional contract interpretation rules to insurance contracts.
B. Bank of the West v. Superior Court: Ordinary Rules of Contract
Interpretation Regain Primacy in California Insurance Law
1. The Facts Giving Rise to the Claim in Bank of the West
When Bank of the West decided to settle a lawsuit brought about by
alleged unfair business practices,' it asserted that the claim which was in
the process of settlement was covered by its CGL policy issued to it by
Industrial Indemnity Co.' The insurer filed for a declaratory judgement
to ascertain the rights and liabilities of the parties under the insurance policy;
to which the Bank cross-complained for alleged breach of the insurance
contract.' The issue was whether the claim in the underlying case was
covered under the "advertising injury" provision of the insurance con-
298. Id. at 1278-79.
299. Id. at 1279.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1280. Although the opinion does not express it as such, the foregoing analysis is
essentially a "nature and kind" inquiry.
302. Bank of the West (then Central Bank) set up the Coast Program, a system by which
consumers, applying through their own insurance agents, could finance their insurance premiums
through the bank to be paid in monthly installments. Bank of the west v. Superior Court, 833
P.2d at 547-48. The consumers did not know that the applications they submitted to their
insurance agents were forwarded to Bank of the West for loan approval. Id. at 548. Upon
approval, the Bank then notified the consumers about their "new loan" which was allegedly
subject to unconscionable terms. Id. The erstwhile "borrowers" filed suit under several
consumer protection statutes, but when this case reached the California Supreme Court, the suits
were incorporated under the Unfair Business Practices Act (§ 17200 et. seq.). Id.
303. The policy provided in pertinent part: "[To] pay on behalf of the insured .. .all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of ... advertising
injury to which this insurance applies ... 'Advertising injury' means injury arising out of an
offense committed during the policy period occurring in the course of the named insured's
advertising activities, if such injury arises out of libel, slander, defamation, violation of right
of privacy, unfair competition, or infringement of copyright, title or slogan." Id. at 550.
304. Id. at 549.
1992]
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tract. 5 In reaching its conclusion, the court had to construe two relevant
policy terms: (1) "unfair competition," and (2) "damages."
2. The Court of Appeals Used the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine to Find Coverage for the Insured
The First District Court of Appeals' found the term "unfair competi-
tion" ambiguous because "unfair competition" was not defined in the policy
and was susceptible to two reasonable interpretations?' The term could
reasonably mean either (1) the common law tort of "passing off another's
goods as one's own," or (2) the broad notion of any "unlawful, unfair or
deceptive act committed against both a business competitor or the public" as
defined in the Business and Professions Code section 17203, Webster's
Dictionary, textbooks, and legal essays."° In light of such an ambiguity
in the coverage provision of the contract, the court applied the longstanding
rule that doubts as to coverage will be construed against the drafter to protect
the reasonable expectations of the insurance consumer.; Therefore, the
court used the broader definition of "unfair competition" which provided
coverage for the insured.31
Addressing the issue as to whether a statutory unfair competition claim
sought "damages," the appeals court noted that the reasonable insured would
not be able to distinguish the difference between relief in equity (most
remedies under the Unfair Business Act are equitable) and those derived from
law in order to provide a broad interpretation of "damages" favoring
305. See supra note 303.
306. The treatment of Bank of the West in the appellate level will hereinafter be cited to as
"Bank of the West L"
307. Bank of the West 1, 277 Cal. Rptr. 219, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1991), review
granted, 807 P.2d 1006 (Cal. 1991), superseded, 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992). This reasoning is
much in line with the interpretational rules set out by Gray and its progeny. See Producers
Dairy Delivery, 718 P.2d at 924-25.
308. Bank of the West 1, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 223 ("[U]nfair competition is a much broader
notion which includes not only the common law, but the statutory and dictionary defunitions of
the tort as well."). The court reasoned (and rightly so) that the statutory definition was relevant
in ascertaining the reasonable expectations of the insured because it is a settled principle that
"all law (including common and statutory) becomes a part of every contract by inference." Id.
at 224 (italics added). Similarly, it is reasonable for the insurer to believe that all the law of
California is integrated into the contract. See Pisciotta, 640 P.2d at 770 ("Our function is not
to select one definition..., but rather to imply from among the range of reasonable meanings
the definition which most favors coverage for the insured") (italics added). Moreover,
dictionary definitions have always helped courts in determining reasonable interpretations and
provided strong inferences as to how a reasonable person would interpret certain nebulous terms.
See e.g., AIU, 799 P.2d at 1269; Pisciotta, 640 P.2d at 769-70.
309. Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Cal.
1978); Holz Rubber, 533 P.2d at 1063.
310. Bank of the West 1, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
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coverage for the insured.3 11 The court also observed that sums paid out by
the unjustly enriched insurance agents and brokers as a result of Bank of the
West's Unfair Business Practices Act violation were "sums sought [to]
constitute compensation for detriment caused by an unlawful act of another"
in accordance with the statutory definition of "damages." 312
In so ruling, the appellate court applied the reasonable expectations
doctrine as it had existed for over twenty years. First, the court reviewed
the allegations in the underlying case. Next, it assessed the policy language
contained in the CGL policy to determine whether patent or latent ambigu-
ities 3 existed in the instrument. When the court determined that an
ambiguity existed in the policy, it construed the ambiguous terms against the
insurer in light of the insured's reasonable expectations. 314  To shed light
upon what a reasonable insured would expect in coverage, the court looked
to statutory and dictionary definitions of the questionable terms. The
ambiguities were then construed in the broadest manner in favor of the
insured. 5
3. The Supreme Court Reverses the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
Along With the Appellate Court Decision
Justice Panelli's opinion pointed out that the overwhelming weight of
authority, contrary to the finding of the appeals court, construed "advertising
injury" arising from "unfair competition" unambiguously to mean the
common law tort, and excluded coverage for statutory claims of unfair
competition.316 The opinion continued by stating that the reasoning of the
appeals court was correct "as a matter of abstract philology" but such an
interpretation of "unfair competition" ignored the context of the policy which
311. Id. at 228. See Pisciotta, 640 P.2d at 768 ("[Cloverage clauses are interpreted broadly
so as to afford the greatest possible protection to the insured" (quoting from State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123, 128 (Cal. 1973))).
312. Bank of the West 1, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29. "Damages" is defined in Cal. Civ. Code
§ 3281. Id. at 229.
313. Patent ambiguities are discernable on the face of the instrument, while latent ambiguities
do not arise out of the language in the instrument itself but by some collateral matter not found
in the document. In re Black's Estate, 27 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1962).
See Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (Cal. Ct. App.
I Dist. 1971) (illustrating a latent ambiguity; policy terminology was not ambiguous but
uncertainty arose from the extrinsic circumstances as to whether flight of insured airplane was
conducted for sales purpose or air taxi purpose).
314. "It is a basic principle of insurance contract interpretation that ... ambiguities arising
out of the policy language ordinarily should be resolved in favor of the insured in order to
protect his reasonable expectation of coverage." Bank of the West 1, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 224(quoting from Producers Dairy Delivery, 718 P.2d at 924).
315. It was a longstanding principle that doubts as to coverage were to be construed against
the insurer and the language read broadly to provide coverage for the insured. Pisciotta, 640
P.2d at 768; Sam Harris, 583 P.2d at 1337; Holz Rubber, 533 P.2d at 1063.
316. Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d at 551. The California Supreme Court
reasoned that administrative regulatory procedure mandated a distinction between statutory unfair
business practice claims and claims pertaining to the common law tort. Id.
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purported to cover a wrong for which damages may be collected. 17 Only
the tort interpretation of unfair competition fit such a context since damages
are not recoverable under statutory unfair competition claims."1 '
Using public policy arguments, the court similarly noted that the term
"damages" as it appeared on the policy was insupportable under the broad
definition319 forwarded by the Bank. The Unfair Business Practices Act,
according to the court, only allows for one form of non-punitive monetary
relief which is disgorgemenel of wrongfully obtained funds. Follow-
ing the interpretation proposed by the Bank would allow insured's who are
in violation of the statute to keep their ill-gotten gains while shifting the loss
to their insurers.' Because such an interpretation would run counter to
317. Id. at 552. The necessary contextual interpretation proposed by the California Supreme
Court did not adequately address the argument that statutory and dictionary definitions are
reliable indicators of what interpretations are reasonable under the circumstances. Interpreting
the terms in a contextual manner runs counter to the settled principle that the words in an
insurance contract are to be read "in their ordinary sense." Producers Dairy Delivery, 718 P.2d
at 925. California courts realized long ago that such sophisticated interpretations are not within
the purview of the ordinary layman. See Steven, 377 P.2d at 294 ("The average man is [not]
expected to carry the Civil Aeronautics Act or the Code of Federal Regulations." (quoting from
Lachs v. Fidelity & Casulty Co., 118 N.E.2d at 558). It is somewhat ironic that a cornerstone
principle of insurance contract interpretation is that courts may not strain to find ambiguities in
the insurance policy. See Producers Dairy Delivery, 718 P.2d at 925; Burr v. Western States
Life Ins. Co., 296 P. 273, 276 (Cal. 1931). The "abstract philology" rationale forwarded by
the Lucas Court appears to be a strained attempt to avoid a finding of actual ambiguity in this
case. The very act of straining to find a contextual reading of the policy shows that there was
an ambiguity in the policy that should not have been sidestepped.
318. Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 552-553.
319. The Bank contended that "damages" should be construed broadly to cover any form of
monetary relief requested. Id. at 553.
320. "[R]estoring ...money ...which may have been acquired by means of... unfair
competition." Id.
321. Id. at 552-53.
322. Id. at 553. The Bank had argued that the case before the bench was analogous to the
situation in AIU wherein the California Supreme Court upheld insurance coverage, which in
essence, allowed FMC, the real party in interest to insure its illegal contamination ectivities.
The court explained the holding in AU was narrowly tailored to fit the needs of that particular
case because the cleanup costs to return the land to its original state, as required by CERCLA,
are sufficiently analogous to damages occasioned by injury to property. Id. at 555-56. The
authors have to wonder whether the court is making its decisions based upon its own result-
oriented public policy agenda rather than legal analysis. In AU, the court had to decide
essentially whether insurers had to participate in indemnifying the state for clean up costs. See
discussion of AU supra in Part III.A.2. The court decided that the ordinary layman could not
ascertain the difference between legal damages and equitable relief. However, in Bank of the
West, the court rejected the same reasoning. Furthermore, the court impliedly held that an
ordinary consumer could, by contextual analysis, determine the difference between common law
unfair competition and statutory unfair competition. There are two distinguishing features
between the cases: (1) In AU, the money recovered would go to the State, or losses would be
borne by the taxpayers who vote for judges, and; (2) Bank of the West involved only money,
and conduct which would almost certainly cause losses. If the court had retained the reasonable
expectations doctrine, a "nature and kind" analysis could have defeated the Bank's alleged
expectation. See supra part II.A.3. & note 198. In AU, the reasonable consum.-r would
expect coverage for losses "because of property damage." Therefore, the losses certainly
stemmed from the nature and kind of harm insured against, whereas in Bank of the West, a pure
loss of money was not the nature and kind of harm that the policyholder was insurem against.
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the legislative intent of deterring unfair business practices, insurable damages
do not include disgorgement relief available under the Unfair Business
Practices Act.3' Consequently, the interpretation forwarded by the Bank
could not conform with the reasonable expectations of the insured.'
The California Supreme Court declared that the Bank invoked the rule
of construing ambiguities against the insurer "too early in the interpretive
process." 3' The court, citing to AIU supra ruled that:
While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to
which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply... "[i]f the
terms of a promise are in any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be
interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of
making it, that the promisee understood it." This rule, as applied to a
promise of coverage in an insurance policy, protects not the subjective
beliefs of the insurer but rather, the objectively reasonable expectations of
the insured. Only if this rule does not resolve the ambiguity do we then
resolve it against the insurer.3 6
Because the court found no ambiguity in the policy, there was no opportunity
for the court to apply this line of reasoning.
From the analyses above, the steps taken by the Supreme Court in Bank
of the West can be compared to the treatment of the same case by the
appellate court which applied the reasonable expectations doctrine in its usual
sense. After reviewing the allegations in the underlying case, the Supreme
Court analyzed the policy language and strained to find clarity by contextual
323. Id. at 553. Here again, the court strained a rationale which would accommodate Bank
of the West without overruling AU. The public policy of deterring illegal conduct applies as
much to would-be CERCLA violators as it does to prospective violators of the Unfair Business
Practices Act. In AU, the California Supreme Court upheld the definition of "damages" and
the rationale (as far as it accords with the reasonable expectations of the insured) as such in the
Aerojet opinion (Aerojet is mentioned briefly in the AU section supra note 293 in part III.B.).
AU, 799 P.2d at 1272. A factor in the Aerojet analysis of the term "damages" (as far as the
term conformed with legal/equitable reief) was that "it would come as an unexpected... shock
to the insureds to discover that their insurance coverage was being denied because the plaintiff
chose to frame his complaint in equity rather than in law." Aerojet-General Corp. v. Superior
Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621, 628 (1st Dist. 1989). The California high court agreed with this
rationale in AI. 799 P.2d at 1266. In Bank of the West, the insured would similarly be "sur-
prised" to learn that the CGL policy did not cover the claims in the underlying case only because
of the manner in which the complaint was framed.
324. Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 557.
325. Id. at 551.
326. Id. at 551-52 (citations omitted). Within these lines lies the biggest danger posed by the
Bank of the West decision to the insurance consumer. In phrasing the ruling this way, the court
has subtly rejected the usual practice that an ambiguity per se gives rise to the contra
proferentem aspect of the reasonable expectations doctrine. Adopting the California Civil Code
procedure in deciding insurance coverage disputes negates the reasonable expectations doctrine
and all the pro-consumer rationales that have supported the Gray rule for all these years.
Furthermore, as we will see infra, adopting section 1649 as the determinative step in the
ambiguity analysis is not only doctrinally and practically problematic but it also poses a grave
risk of abuse by the insurer. The insertion of section 1649 in the interpretive equation is
enigmatic because the court labored to find no ambiguity in the CGL and did not have an
opportunity to apply the section 1649 analysis.
43
Romaker and Prieto: Expectations Lost: Bank of the West v. Superior Court Places the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
interpretation and analyses of extrinsic circumstances like public policy and
judicial treatment of the same issue in other jurisdictions. The court then
used the absence of an ambiguity to deny the insured from having had any
reasonable expectations of coverage under the policy.
Although it was unused and unnecessary for the disposition of the matter
at hand, the court laboriously inserted section 1649 into the analytical
picture.327 Justice Panelli explained that "[t]his rule . . . protects not the
subjective beliefs of the insurer, but rather, 'the objectively reasonable
expectations of the insured.'" 3" If section 1649 did not clear up the
uncertainty, according to the court, then the ambiguity must be construed
against the insurer.32
The Court indirectly provided the framework for a new doctrine to
govern insurance contract interpretation, but did not apply it to dispose of the
present case. Such judicial action is an obvious invitation for the lower
courts to experiment with the rule.
Had the California Supreme Court wished to revert back to traditional
contract interpretation maxims (extant in the California Civil Code), there
should have been no mention whatsoever of the insured's reasonable
expectations" in the opinion. Oddly enough, Justice Panelli rationalized
the result obtained therein by referring to the expectations of the insured.3
Bank of the West instructs courts to apply section 1654's directive of strict
construction against the insurer only when reasonable expectations are
derived by the insured from the contract language. 32 Under the traditional
theory practiced by the California courts prior to Gray, ambiguous contract
language was strictly construed against the insurer regardless of any
expectations derived by the insured.33 Within the framework established
by Gray and its progeny, judicial construction of the insurance policy against
327. The use of the Cal. Civil Code was legitimized by its appearance in the recent AJU
decision (although it was not used to decide AU either).
328. Id. at 552. It is puzzling why an objective analysis requires the perceptions of the
opposing party to the contract to control the determination of reasonableness. Pragmatically,
the result obtained therein is analogous to letting the fox guard the hen house. See infra Part
III.C.3. for a more detailed analysis of this issue.
329. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654 (West 1985).
330. Analysis of the insured's reasonable expectations resulted from judge-made law (making
its first California appearance in Neal) subsequent to the pronouncements of the California Civil
Code enacted in 1872.
331. Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 557.
332. Id. at 552 ("[A] court that is faced with an argument for coverage based on assertedly
ambiguous policy language must first attempt to determine whether coverage is consistent with
the insured's objectively reasonable expectations." (emphasis added)).
333. Traditional contract interpretation's use of contra proferentem (embodied in § 1654) is
distinct from its variant reasonable expectations formulation. Judge Keeton recognized the
difference in application of the two theories when he extolled the virtues of the reasonable
expectations formulation as often being more favorable to the insurer since construing contract
language against the insurer under contra proferentem is not tempered by the requirement the
insured develop reasonable expectations from the ambiguity which is inherent in the reasonable
expectations doctrine. Keeton, supra note 21, at 969.
[Vol. 29
44
California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss1/4
BANK OF THE WEST V. SUPERIOR COURT
the insurer required that the insured had objectively reasonable expecta-
tions3M of coverage and steered clear of the section 1649 rule mandated by
Bank of the West.
Justice Panelli's opinion bodes ill for the insurance consumer because
aside from re-introducing section 1649 and the traditional analytical structure
to the insurance sphere, the insured is made to jump an extra hoop by the
court's version of section 1654. Unlike the statutory rule, the court now
mandates strict construction against the insurer only when the insured derives
reasonable expectations from the assertedly ambiguous language.3' Such
an analysis neither remains true to the traditional contract construction theory
of the California Civil Code nor to Gray and its progeny.
C. What Section 1649 Means to Future Insurance Coverage Disputes
It is not immediately certain what Bank of the West has left of the old
law in its wake.3' The foregoing discussion, however, illustrates the
immense doctrinal shift that Bank of the West embodies. This enormous shift
stems from the California Supreme Court's apparent adoption of inapplicable
traditional contract interpretation canons in complete disregard of the
adhesion contract doctrine. There are doctrinal and practical problems
associated with the entry of traditional contract interpretation rules into the
insurance contract arena. This may have prompted the California Supreme
Court not to apply the analysis mandated by section 1649 even in light of its
introduction into the interpretive scheme.
1. The Canons of Construction Mandated By Bank of the West Reflect
Traditional, But Inapplicable, Contract Law Assumptions
The California Civil Code's rules governing the construction of contracts
reflects the traditional contract interpretation model. It states that the
primary purpose for judicial construction of contracts is to ascertain the
334. "IThere has always been an implicit understanding that ambiguities which in most cases
might be resolved in more than just one or the other of two ways, would be resolved favorably
to the insured's claim only if a reasonable person in his position would have expected coverage."
Id. (citing Steven v. Fidelity & Ca. Co., 374 P.2d 284, 288-89 (Cal. 1962)).
335. The court decided that statutory Unfair Competition does not contemplate an award of
damages and a definition of "unfair competition" which envisions a damages award "cannot
reflect the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured." Id. at 557. "Because the context
elucidates the meaning [of 'unfair competition'] there is no need to resort to the rule that
ambiguities are resolved against the insurer." Id.
336. Some see Bank of the West as a narrow decision confined to the "unfair competition" and
"advertising injury" coverage clauses only. John E. Morris, Insurers Relieved By High Court
Coverage Ruling; Justices Give Narrow Reading of "Advertising Injury," THE RwECORDER, July
31, 1992, at 1. "Some lawyers said the decision could signal a larger shift away from the
traditional rule that any ambiguity in the policy is interpreted in favor of the insured." Id.
1992]
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intent of the parties. 37 This intent is to be derived from the language of
the contract provided that the language is clear and unambiguous.3" When
the language is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties should be
ascertained from the written memorial alone if possible.339 But in the event
of ambiguous language, extrinsic evidence which has a tendency to prove the
parties' intentions will be allowed' and the ambiguous terms will be
construed in light of what the promisor believed, at the time of the
agreement, that the promisee understood it to mean. 1 If that does not
resolve the ambiguity, then the doctrine of contra proferentem may be used
and the terms are to be construed against the drafter of the contract.'
These canons of construction presuppose a bargained-for agreement resulting
in a contract which was mutually assented to. Furthermore, the interpretive
rules dictated by the California Civil Code were enacted in 1872 and did not
foresee the widespread use of adhesion contracts, the disparate bargaining
power between the parties, nor the lack of competition in a market best
described as an oligopoly.
The Gray approach coincided with the Civil Code only up to the point
of section 1649 where the two principles diverged. Reasonable expectations
skipped the section 1649 analysis and went straight into section 1654's contra
proferentem rule,' differing only in that such construction against the
drafter is limited by reasonable expectations of the consumer/promisee."
The jump to contra proferentem was due to a judicial realization that the
insurer/promisor, when contracting with insureds, was in a power position
over the consumer as promisee.35
337. "A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties
as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1636 (West 1985); Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 552; AIU, 799 P.2d at 1264.
338. "The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and
explicit, and does not involve an absurdity." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1638 (West 1985).
339. "When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained
from the writing alone, if possible; subject, however, to the other provisions of this Title."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1639 (West 1985).
340. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856 (West 1983). See also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
341. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1649 (West 1985); See supra note 277 for the full text of § 1649. See
also Medical Operations Mgt., Inc. v. National Health Lab. Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 455, 459 (Cal.
Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1986).
342. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654 (West 1985); Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 552; Beaumont-
Gribin-Von Dyl Management Co. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 134 Cal. Rptr. 25, 27 (Cal.App. 2
Dist. 1976). Construction against the drafter outside the domain of insurance is a secondary
maxim of construction. See supra note 42. But it must be recalled that the reasonable
expectations doctrine in California is a variant of contra proferentem which was elevated to a
rightful primary doctrine on its own, supported by legitimate judicial policy. See Steven, 377
P.2d at 290.
343. "[I]n the law of insurance ... the ambiguity principle is transformed from a last-resort
interpretive 'tie-breaker' into a tool of substantive policy that is intended systematically to favor
the weaker party in the transaction." Rahdert, supra note 115, at 328.
344. See Producer's Dairy Delivery, 718 P.2d at 924.
345. See Garcia, 682 P.2d at 1105-06.
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2. Section 1649 Does Not Adequately Address the Absence of
Mutual Assent in an Adhesion Contract
Section 1649 embodies a requirement that the courts resolve ambiguities
in contracts to effect the intentions of the parties.' This is done by
construing the policy in the manner in which the promising party thought the
other party understood. 7 It is a way of trying to ascertain what it was
that the parties agreed to.' However, such a laborious effort is not
applicable to insurance contracts. Insurance contracts are "special" precisely
because there is no mutual assent to an adhesion contract.4 9 Gray and its
progeny made it clear that distinct rules applied to adhesion/insurance
contracts because insureds rarely read, much less understand, the promises
in their insurance policies.3' In the absence of cognizance by the insured
of the matters contained within the contract document, there can be no
mutual assent.351
Consequently, a judicial search for mutual assent is a legal impossibility.
For this reason, all ambiguities were construed against the insurer to
effectuate the reasonable expectations of the insurance consumer. 52
346. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (West 1985). See also Patterson, supra note 25, at 854.
Professor Patterson notes that looking for the mutual intent of the parties "must be used with
caution" because often both parties are at cross purposes which if apparent, encourages courts
to fill in the gaps by judicial ascertainment of a "common purpose."
347. Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 552.
348. "It is... a general rule that the intent and meaning of the parties is far more important
than the strict literal sense of the words used in the contract." Dart Equipment Corp. v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 670, 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1970).
349. "[I1n the purely judicial development of our law we have taken the law of insurance
practically out of the category of contract, and we have established that the duties of public
service companies are not contractual... but are instead relational." Gray, 419 P.2d at 171 n.6(quoting POUND, THE SPIRIT OF COMMON LAW 47 (1921)) (italics added).
350. Professor Rakoff expresses this view about traditional contracts analysis being used to
determine mutual intent in adhesion contracts: "mhe traditional treatment requires that
adherents to form contracts be treated as if they had read and understood the document presented
to them, even if that conclusion is false and known by the other party to be so ...mhe
adherent has a 'duty to read' the document before signing it." Rakoff, supra note 26, at 1187.
See also Keeton, supra note 21, at 968.
351. Rahdert, supra note 115, at 329. To further exacerbate the problem, "[tihe risk manager
knows enough to read the policy and check for the basics of the coverage, but it is not the basic
situations that give rise to coverage disputes and lawsuits. Instead, it is the extraordinary
situation which was never contemplated by the parties and therefore could not possibly have been
in the risk manager's mind when he or she reviewed the coverage." Wollan & Weinstein, supra
note 79, at 84 (italics added). Thus, "in the absence of plain and unequivocal exceptions,
[insurance contracts] are construed to intend that which the insured is likely to understand."
Moore v. Fidelity & Casulty Ins. Co. of N.Y., 295 P.2d 154, 157 (Cal. App. Dept. Super. Ct.
1956).
352. Interpreting contracts involves analysis of intent and reasonable expectations of the parties
upon entering into an agreement; thus, the court must study not only the contract form but also
the policyholder's knowledge and cognizance as a layperson and the "normal" expectations of
coverage under the insurance policy. Aas v. Avemco Ins. Co. 127 Cal. Rptr. 192, 198 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1 Dist. 1976).
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The biggest apparent deviation from Gray involves the introduction of
section 1649 to the insurance contract interpretation rules. Because it was
introduced but not used by the court, section 1649 appeared to assume the
role of gatekeeper, preventing the contra proferentem rule of section 1654
from coming to play too early in the interpretive process. What makes the
Bank of the West decision ominous, is the relegation of contra proferentem
back into a doctrine of last resort.3 53 The courts may now construct
uncertain language against the insurer only upon exhaustion of all the other
traditional contract construction rules.35 The previous rule that any
reasonable doubt as to coverage will be construed strictly against the insurer,
and the language will be understood in its most inclusive sense,355 seems
to have no place under Bank of the West.
3. Section 1649 Invites a Subjective Interpretation to
Govern the Construction of Insurance Contracts
When Professor Keeton introduced his reasonable expectations theorem,
he exalted the fact that the standard used in honoring the insured's reasonable
expectations was an objective one.356 Under the reasonable expectations
doctrine, the fiction of mutual intent was resolved by honoring the expecta-
tions of the reasonable consumer. Therefore a judge would: (1) read the
insurance policy, (2) compare it to the factual circumstances, and (3)
determine objectively whether an ordinary consumer would, in light of the
prevailing circumstances, reasonably expect coverage from the policy at
hand. This model generally made a subjective inquiry unnecessary and
irrelevant.357
As the court noted in Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta, "[w]hen
confronted with standardized provisions in a form insurance contract, the
353. See supra note 342. Beaumont-Gribin-Von Dyl and Bank of the West explain that to
resolve the ambiguity section 1654, which expressly conditions its use after section 1636 et seq.,
should only be used as a last resort rule. It appears from the early insurance cases (which are
treated infra part III.C.4.), that the doctrine of contra proferentem was a per se rule when
involving insurance companies. Non-insurance contracts cases use § 1654 as a tie-breaker rule
only. See Western Camps, Inc. v. Riverway Ranch Enter., 138 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2 Dist. 1977); Felt v. L.B. Frederick Co., 206 P.2d 676, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist.
1949).
354. See supra text accompanying note 328.
355. Holz Rubber, 533 P.2d at 1063.
356. "An objective standard produces an essential degree of certainty and predictability about
legal rights, as well as a method of achieving equity . . . between insurer and insured ..
Keeton, supra note 21, at 968.
357. See Producers Dairy Delivery, 718 P.2d at 925 ("[I]f the evidence offered would not
persuade a reasonable man that the instrument meant anything other than the ordinary meaning
of its words, it is useless." (quoting from Blumenfeld v. R.H. Macy & Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 652
(Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1979)); City of Mill Valley v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 159 Cal. Rptr.
635, 638-39 (Cal. Ct. App. I Dist. 1980) (explaining that testimony of underwriter in as far as
it purports to show intended coverage other than that defined on the face of the policy has no
probative value).
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primary focus of our inquiry is on the reasonable expectations of the insured
at the time he purchased the coverage."358 The Bank of the West analysis
maintains that "this rule [section 1649], as applied to a promise of coverage
in an insurance policy, protects not the subjective beliefs of the insurer but
rather, the 'objectively reasonable expectations of the insured.'" ' 59
However, the rule, by its own terms, belies the foregoing statement. Section
1649 demands inquiry into what the insurer believed that the consumer
understood-thus requiring scrutiny of the parties themselves. No analysis
of the promisee's (insured's) reasonable expectations is required by the Code
section. Rather, the sole inquiry pertains to what the promisor (insurer)
believed the promisee understood. The test proposed by Bank of the West
necessarily involves a test of actual subjective understanding involving no
inquiry whatsoever into reasonableness. Ascertaining the belief of one
particular party vis-a-vis the understanding of the other party cannot be
disguised as an objective determination.
The Lucas Court's shifting of the focus of inquiry from the objectively
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer to the subjective under-
standing of the insurance company blatantly ignores the fundamental adhesion
theory of insurance contracts. This doctrine sought to protect the consumer
from the inequity inherent in unequal bargains and the readily apparent
danger of overreaching by insurers." As Professor Rahdert pointed out
in 1986, "such a retreat [to traditional contract doctrine] displays an ostrich-
like unwillingness to confront head on the realities of the adhesion insurance
contract."" 1 California's hybrid reasonable expectations doctrine supplied
a means to check the power of the insurance industry in the contract
equation, but at the same time prevented the misuse of the doctrine by the
358. 640 P.2d at 769. See Gray, 419 P.2d at 171-72.
359. Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 552.
360. See also Keeton, supra note 21, at 963. Cf. 13 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN
APP.amN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7401 (rev. vol. 1976) ("And if, from the
language employed in the policy, it is possible to adopt either of two reasonably consistent
interpretations, that construction will be adopted which permits recovery, rather than the one
which would deny coverage. This is true even though the insurer may have contemplated a
different construction") (italics added).
361. Rahdert, supra note 115, at 373. This is an echo of Professor Kessler's belief that: "The
task of adjusting in each individual case the common law of contracts to contracts of adhesion
has to be faced squarely and not indirectly. ... [C]ourts have an understandable tendency to
avoid this issue by way of rationalizations. They prefer to convince themselves and the
community that legal certainty and 'sound principles' of contract law should not be sacrificed
to the dictates of justice or social desirability. Such discussions are hardly profitable." Kessler,
supra note 59, at 637. Current non-insurance contracts cases mirror the pre-Gray insurance
contract interpretation analyses. See e.g., Medical Operations Mgt., Inc. v. Nat'l Health Lab.,
Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1986); W. Camps, Inc. v. Riverway Ranch
Enter., 138 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 2 Dist. 1977). The promisor, however, is not always
the drafter in these cases. See Western Camps, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 924. The steps in the proof
process, the type of evidence allowed, the rule governing ambiguities, contra proferentem as a
secondary interpretation maxim are identical in all respects to the pre-Gray rules of insurance
contract interpretation. In light of the Bank of the West decision, future insurance contract
construction cases will probably resemble all other contract construction cases. Contrary to
Justice Panelli's assertion, insurance contracts will not be so "special" after all.
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insured through the requirement that the expectations derived by the insurer
be objectively reasonable.2'
Under the Gray formulation, analysis of reasonable expectations involved
the judiciary as the outcome determinative party. The judge, as a neutral
third party determined whether the expectations derived by the insured were
reasonable under the circumstances.' As Professor Henderson correctly
points out, the insurer's reasonable belief will likely differ from that of the
insured.' By virtue of the insurer's greater experience and knowledge of
the intricacies of insurance, his perception of what is objectively reasonable
to expect under particular policy provisions will undoubtedly differ from that
of the reasonable unversed insured.' The insurer, with the plethora of
knowledge he possesses, will not contemplate expectations which would have
been reasonable in a layperson's point of view when drafting policy terms.
A truly objective determination would weigh the particular insured's
expectations with those reasonably derived by others with an equal lack of
sophistication because only insurers and creative lawyers can derive any
meaning from standard "insurese."367 The standard proposed by section
362. "[A] finding of ambiguity in policy language cannot be based on an unreasonable
misunderstanding on the part of the insured." Producers Dairy Delivery, 718 P.2d at 925; See
also Rahdert, supra note 115, at 370. Thus, the reasonable expectations doctrine was not merely
a "sword" for the insured's benefit, but could also be used as a "shield" by the insurer in the
appropriate case where expectations were unreasonable or not present. Wollan & Weinstein,
supra note 79, at 84.
363. This has been a point of contention for those opposed to the reasonable expectations
doctrine. See generally Mayhew, supra note 12 (reasonable expectations doctrine used as covert
judicial tool). But as the court in Henningsen supra quoted from Corbin, judges are still
"chancellors" who look to equity in situations where there is fundamental unfairness in the
bargaining situation. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 85-86 (quoting 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 128 (1950)). "The task of the judiciary is to administer the spirit as well as
the letter of the law." Steven, 377 P.2d at 297 (quoting Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 94). One's
view regarding this issue will be influenced greatly by one's predilection towards judicial
activism or conservatism. For an illuminating study of this issue in the area of reasonable
expectations, see generally Swisher, supra note 71.
364. Henderson, supra note 16, at 847. Professor Henderson was analyzing the objective
"reasonableness" standard and the differences inherent between the Keeton-type reasonable
expectations and that contained in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211. The
Restatement (Second) formulation is similar to that espoused by § 1649 because in both cases,
the determination of objective reasonableness is predicated upon the insurer's perception of the
insured's state of mind at the time of contracting. Under § 211 of the Restatement (Second),
an adhesive standard form contract is presumed enforceable unless the insurer (promisor) had
reason to believe that the insured (promisee) would not have assented to the contract had she
known that certain terms existed in the contract. See supra note 18 for the full text of § -211.
365. Id. Leaving the market forces to shape what is reasonable under the circumstances is
unacceptable because the businessman is out to protect his own interests and lacks the
impartiality of the judge. Rakoff, supra note 26, at 1204.
366. "The thrust of the reasonable expectations doctrine is . . . more concerned with the
impact of particular policy provisions in the run of cases. Accordingly, the expectations of the
average insured, not the plight of the particular claimant should be the main inquiry." Rahdert,
supra note 115, at 387.
367. As shown by the disparate treatment of Bank of the West by the First District appellate
court and the California Supreme Court (detailed supra), even learned judges disagree over the
meanings to be given to insurance language.
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1649 is only quasi-objective. Shifting the focus of inquiry from the insured
to the insurer "contains a . . . bias, that does not exist in the Keeton
formulation."'
The reasonable expectations doctrine also imposed a clearer duty upon
the insurer to draft clear and unambiguous policy language.' The section
1649 analysis would permit an insurer to hide behind obfuscating language
since his perceptions will control the outcome of the case. The problem
concerning the adhesive nature of insurance contracts is still as real today as
it was in 1966. Unfortunately, the post-Bank of the West state of the law
may be attributed not to a change in the circumstances surrounding insurance
contracts but merely to changes in the composition of the California Supreme
Court in recent years.3"
4. Addition of Section 1649 Imposes a Heavier
Evidentiary Burden on the Insured
Under the Bank of the West analysis, the insured must prove that the
insurer knew what the insured understood the contract to mean. In order for
the insured to prove the insurer's knowledge of the insured's expectations,
resort must be had to extrinsic evidence. The type of extrinsic evidence
required by section 1649 is not readily available to the modern-day insured
in light of prevailing business practices.
Pre-Gray insurance coverage cases using section 1649 exemplify the
need for extrinsic evidence in order for the insured to satisfy his burden of
proof. In Norton v. Farmers Inter-Insurance Exchange,3"' the dispute
arose out of auto insurance contract language limiting the insurer's liability
to occurrences giving rise to injuries when only the insured himself was
operating the insured vehicle.' The plaintiff, who was the deceased
insured's daughter-in-law, appealed from the trial court's refusal to allow
extrinsic evidence. 3  The proffered evidence consisted of testimony
concerning the negotiations between the insured and the defendant compa-
ny.3 4 The conversations tended to show that the deceased insured commu-
368. Henderson, supra note 16, at 848.
369. Id.
370. It is ironic to note that the increasing trend towards formalist courts in California would
result in these courts pursuing the very same type of judicial activism that they railed against and
eventually supplanted.
371. 105 P.2d 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1940).
372. The limiting provision, under the heading "Terms and Conditions Forming a Part of This
Contract" and sub-heading, "Risks Not Assumed By This Exchange" stated in part: "The
Exchange shall not be liable for loss or damage ... (D) Caused while the said automobile is
being driven or operated by any person other than the Insured or a member of his immediate
family or his paid driver; unless said person, otherwise qualified hereunder, is temporarily
operating said vehicle with the consent of the Insured except that the extension provided for in
this condition shall not be available to:..." Id. at 137.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 138.
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nicated his desire to have his daughter-in-law covered under the policy, to
which the insurer's agent orally acquiesced.37
The California Supreme Court held that the language employed by the
insurer was ambiguous.376 Therefore, extrinsic evidence relating to the
situation surrounding the transaction was admissible.' T  The court also
noted that neither party had to show which of the interpretations was more
logical, since under section 1649, the policy is construed in light of what the
insurer believed, at the time, the insured understood the transaction to mean.
The extrinsic evidence showed that the insurer knew about the insured's
expectation of coverage.
The importance of extrinsic evidence to a section 1649 determination is
obvious. The contract which contains language ambiguous enough to trigger
the application of section 1649, cannot provide the court with the information
it needs to establish the intent of the parties."'
The extrinsic evidence need not pertain exclusively to the time the
agreement was reached.3" Thus, in McPhail v. Pacific Indemnity Co. ,381
the First District Appeals Court analyzed extrinsic evidence such as the
conversations between the insurer's agent and the insured prior to the
375. Id. The extrinsic evidence stricken by the trial court consisted of testimony by two
witnesses who said that they were present and overheard the conversations on several occasions
between the insured and the insurance agent wherein the insured stated unequivocally that he
wanted coverage under the policy for his daughlter-in-law since he (the insured) was not driving
anymore and she was doing most of the driving at the time. The agent replied that the request
would be taken care of in the policy.
376. Id. at 139.
377. "IF]or the purpose of determining what the parties intended by the language used, it is
competent to show not only the circumstances under which the contract was made, but also to
prove that the parties intended and understood the language in the sense contended for; and for
that purpose the conversations between and declarations of the parties during the negotiations
at and before the time of execution of the contract may be shown." Id. at 140 (paraphrasing
from Balfour v. Fresno C. & I. Co., 41 P. 876, 877 (Cal. 1895)).
378. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1647 (West 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212
cmt. b (1979) (allowing for extrinsic evidence to ascertain the transaction in "length and
breadth" but language still remains the most important evidence).
379. Extrinsic evidence is especially important considering that, contrary to the Bank of the
West Court's claims, § 1649 seeks evidence of the insurer's subjective knowledge. See supra
discussion of Norton v. Farmers Inter-Ins. Exch.
380. See Pac. Gas & Elec., 442 P.2d at 645. ("[R]ational interpretation requires at least a
preliminasy consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties")
(italics added).
381. 180 P.2d 735 (Cal. Ct. App. I Dist. 1947). In this case, the plaintiff acquired a
comprehensive liability policy from the defendant insurer which offered to cover all other risks
not protected against by the plaintiff's present insurer who only covered the plaintiff's company-
owned vehicles. Id. at 736. The insurer issued the policy with the following qualification:
"IT]he insurance provided . . . shall not extend to cover any bodily injuries, . . . death or
property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use by the assured of automobiles,
motor vehicles, trailers and/or non motor driven road making equipment while being towed
behind or carried upon motor driven equipment, including the loading and unloading thereof."
Id. at 737. The appellate court agreed with the trial court and found that the policy covered all
vehicles except when such were being carried or towed. Id. at 737-38. Thus, when the insured
hired cement mixers, one of which injured a third party, the insurer was held responsible for
defense of the suit and indemnity for the insured pursuant to the policy of insurance.
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purchase of insurance and both the insurer's and the insured's actions
subsequent to the issuance of the policy, to determine that the insurer was
well aware of what the insured thought was covered under the contract.32
Modem business practices are more impersonal than they were when the
early cases discussed above were decided. Insurance policies are purchased
over the telephone and through networks of independent insurance brokers.
The insured has scant opportunity to derive any useable extrinsic evidence
in the absence of face to face transactions.
Section 1649 requires an evidentiary showing by the insured that the
insurer was aware of the insured's understanding of the policy coverage. It
would seem a simple matter to impute any knowledge of the insurance sales
agent to the insurer. 31 Therefore, the insured, as in Norton and McPhail,
could establish that she expressed her expectations of coverage to the agent.
This would tend to demonstrate the insurer's knowledge of the insured's
expectations which would result in a decision in favor of the insured.
However, this analysis depends upon the law of agency.3 It assumes that
the insurance salesman is the agent of the insurer. Such a situation is fast
becoming a rarity in present day insurance business practice. Much of the
insurance business is conducted through insurance brokers who are
considered agents of the insured ,3 5 therefore, the statements and knowl-
edge of the broker are not binding upon the insurer."s
For greater market share, today's insurers drown the consumer with
advertisements to get under the "Traveler's umbrella," that they "are in good
hands with Allstate," or "like a good neighbor, State Farm is there." These
blurbs are designed to elicit a feeling of trust and reliance by the insured
upon the good faith of the insurer:
The policyholder's chronic tendency to rely on the insurer's determination
as to what constitutes adequate protection is widespread and often
reasonable under the circumstances. In part, it has been fostered by
382. Id. at 739. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1979) ("Where the
other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he
knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement").
383. See supra discussions of Norton and McPhail.
384. Whether the insurance sales representative is a principal of the insurer or the insured is
determined by the laws of agency. 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Companies § 146 (1977). See
Eddy v. Sharp, 245 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 3 Dist. 1988) (holding that an insurance
broker who selects one among a number of insurers to provide coverage for the insured at the
insured's direction is an agent of the insured).
385. "[Ain insurance agent is one who is authorized by an insurer to transact insurance on its
behalf, whereas a broker... transacts insurance on behalf of the insured." 39 CAL. JUR. 3D
Insurance Companies § 145 at 142 (1977).
386. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1222 (West 1966) (requiring party opponent admissions be made
by authorized agent). One probable result of the difficult evidentiary burden imposed by the
decision in Bank of the West would be a tremendous increase in lawsuits by consumers against
insurance brokers for the insurance industry's failure to provide the coverage which the insured
reasonably expected. This is because the insured will be better able to establish what she told
the broker she wanted as opposed to what the insurer ultimately knew.
1992]
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insurance marketing practices, ranging from the selling techniques of local
agents to representations in national advertising-one might call it the
"good hands" phenomenon. In part, it represents a sensible human
response to the adhesive character of the transaction.?
Unfortunately, the insurance consumer cannot use these representations as
extrinsic evidence to prove any knowledge of the insurer vis-a-vis the
insured's reasonable expectations of coverage precisely because the
advertisements sell security3 8 and service, not coverage.
5. Section 1649 Gives Insurers an Unfair Advantage in the Proof Process
The change of focus to the perceptions of the insurer will cause any
evidence proffered by the insured regarding the insurer's knowledge to be
refuted facilely by the insurer. Ninety-five percent of all casualty policies
are written by the Insurance Services Office1 (ISO). The ISO collects
statistical data from which it calculates the risks pertaining to specific
standard form language. 3" Consequently, it is fair to assume that the
language that appears on the consumer's form contract is the "safest"
possible terminology favoring the risk-averse insurer. 391' A reasonable
insurer would not logically include terms in the standard policy which an
insured would reasonably misconstrue-this is the raison d'etre of the ISO.
Thus, when an insured claims expectations of coverage based upon an
ambiguous policy provision, the insurer need only offer the ISO data
pertaining to the provision in question to swiftly negate any perception on the
insurer's part regarding the contested language. 31 The ISO data is
intrepidly guarded by insurers as a trade secret and many a lawsuit has been
bogged down in pre-trial discovery due to the refusal of insurers to share this
"trade" information with counsel for the insured.
387. Rahdert, supra note 115, at 343 (footnote omitted).
388. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967)
(explaining that insurance company is in the business of selling peace of mind).
389. Henry J. Reske, Was There a Liability Crisis?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 46 (the
percentage figure above was alleged in an insurance industry lawsuit). The ISO creates the
standard policy language used in insurance contracts; it is a trade pact which represents over a
thousand insurance companies and is run on a non-profit basis. Id.
390. Bank of the West, 833 P.2d at 550.
391. Insurance companies require exact calculation of risks in order to thrive, and in th- drive
for increased profits, insurers are especially leery of what Professor Patterson describes as
"judicial risk"-the risk that courts would find contrary to the insurer when the probabilities
derived by the insurer in the calculation of risk, pertaining to specific provisions in the contract
were determined to fall the other way. Risks that are difficult to calculate can be excluded
altogether. See Kessler, supra note 59, at 631.
392. See Maryland Casulty Co. v. Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 4 Dist. 1990),
review denied, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 4366 (Cal. 1990). Finding coverage under the policy
provisions, the court in Reeder used an ISO circular (published for use of insurer to explain
"extent, purpose, and effect" of ISO-drafted standardized language) to show that the insured's
explanations were identical to the ISO interpretation. Id. at 725.
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6. If Section 1649 is applied literally, insurance litigation will
become more complicated and expensive
The reasonable expectations analysis was a streamlined process which
involved the following steps: (1) review the policy, (2) analyze the underly-
ing lawsuit, (3) ascertain ambiguity, (4) determine the reasonable expecta-
tions of an ordinary consumer, and (5) resolve the case. Under the
interpretation rule of section 1649, the reviewing court would also employ
the first three analytical steps in the reasonable expectations method but the
similarity ends there.
After Bank of the West, courts would have to continue the analysis by
subsequently: (1) determining the insured's beliefs, and (2) ascertaining
whether the insurer was aware of the insured's beliefs (failure in this step
ends the analysis). Furthermore, if the objectively reasonable expectations
dicta in Bank of the West is applied, the analysis must continue with: (3)
determining whether the insured's expectations are reasonable, (4) if they are
reasonable, then the ambiguity is resolved against the insurer. Consequently,
Bank of the West harms the insurance consumer in a number of ways: (1) It
subrogates the insured's reasonable expectations to that of the insurer; (2) it
revives traditional and technical canons of construction formerly deemed
inapplicable to an insurance contract analysis; (3) It creates an impossible
burden of proof considering the structure of the modern marketplace and the
concentrated might of the ISO.
Additionally, if the "reasonable expectations" language contained in the
Bank of the West opinion has any force, it acts to further limit the insured's
ability to recover under the insurance policy. As noted previously, under a
non-insurance contract analysis, once section 1649 fails to resolve an
ambiguity, the court applies section 1654's contra proferentem as a per se
rule regardless of any determination of reasonableness. Bank of the West
added an extra analytical step into the interpretive equation by requiring that
the expectations derived by the policyholder be reasonable before contra
proferentem applies.
In order to satisfy his burden of proot using section 1649, an
insurance litigant will require the services of expert industry witnesses such
as underwriters and insurance agents39' to determine what an insurer would
believe an insured expects by way of coverage under certain circumstances.
Pre-trial discovery procedures will be magnified in complexity and expense
393. The insured has the burden of showing inclusion under the policy's coverage provisions
while the insurer bears the burden of establishing non-coverage under the policy's exclusion
language. See City of Beverly Hills v. Chicago Ins. Co., 668 F.Supp. 1402, 1405-06 (C.D.
Cal. 1987).
394. This assumes the plaintiff can convince them to testify against their employers. If the
plaintiff decides to go by another route, he may procure the services of ex-industry workers
which will also undoubtedly be expensive.
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and unfortunately, it is the insurance consumer, less capable of shouldering
the economic cost, who will undoubtedly suffer.
The practical effect of adding section 1649 is to deny consumers the
ability to obtain that which they expected when they bought insurance. Only
the very wealthy will now be able to afford a battle against the economic
might of an insurer.
7. Even the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Section 211 Provides No Refuge
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts specifically provides for the form
contract situation. 95 The Restatement's application is flawed in the same
manner as the California Civil Code's traditional contract interpretation
canons because both approaches do not adequately provide for the realities
of the modern marketplace." Furthermore, as the discussion below will
illustrate, section 211 concerns itself more with conscionability rather than
ambiguity.
Professor Henderson forecast in 1990, that the new trend in the law
appears to be towards the adoption of Restatement (Second) section 211
(hereinafter section 211) to govern insurance contract disputes 97 He
based his predictions upon recent decisions of the Iowa and Arizona3
Supreme Courts. Section 211 mandates that standardized contracts, whether
read by the insured or not are presumptively enforceable.' Subsection (3)
of the rule contains this language: "Where the other party has reason to
believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that
395. The Restatement (Second) of Contract's § 211 is entitled "Standardized Agreements."
See supra note 18 for the complete text of the relevant Restatement (Second) section.
396. See supra discussion in part III.C.4.
397. Henderson, supra note 16 at 846.
398. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981), later
proceeding, 343 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1984). In Sandbulte, the insured farmer held a general farm
liability policy which contained a motor vehicle exclusion clause which provided no coverage
for incidents arising out of the use of a motor vehicle outside of the insured's farm or the ways
adjoining such. Id. at 106-07. Since the insured owned several separate parcels of land, he
would travel between the parcels in the course of his farm work and it was while engaged in
such an endeavor, that a collision occurred between the insured's truck and another vehicle. Id.
at 107.
399. Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1984).
In Darner, the insured motor vehicle sales and leasing company obtained a general business risk
policy and separate insurance coverage for lessees of their vehicles from an agent of the insured.
Id. at 390. There was some misunderstanding pertaining to the coverage amount of the lessee
liability policy upon its renewal a year and a half later. Id. The insured believed that the
coverage amount fell below the amount in the original policy and claimed to have phoned the
agent to see the agent about it because the insured's rental agreements contained representations
of the alleged higher coverage amount. Id. Before any action was taken by either side, a lessee
was involved in an accident and sued the insured for coverage of the amount represented in the
rental agreement. Id. at 391.
400. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1), (2) (1979).
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the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agree-
ment."'40
Under section 3, comment f, the A.L.I. authors proposed that "reason
to believe" can be inferred by three factors: (1) the term is bizarre or oppres-
sive, (2) eviscerates expressly agreed terms, or (3) eliminates the dominant
purpose of the transaction.'
The shift of focus to the promisor/insurer here seems less formalistic
than the section 1649 formulation because the third test pertaining to the
"dominant purpose" sounds very much like the "nature and kind" formula-
tion proposed by Justice Tobriner in Gray v. Zurich.' However, the
application of the doctrine by the Iowa Supreme Court in Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company v. Sandbulte was not very promising. The court
took a very narrow view of the "dominant purpose test" by placing greater
weight on the exclusionary language rather than the fact that the damages
occurred within the scope of the farming business, which was arguably the
dominant purpose for the procurement of the insurance.' The problem
with the "dominant purpose test" is that an insured's "dominant purpose"
will always be the procurement of insurance protectiono and unless the
policy provisions so grossly undercut all coverage expectations will any
construction in favor of the insured occur. All three exceptions to the
general rule of section 211 enforceability hinge upon extraordinary coverage-
defeating provisions but not to the subtle methods by which insurers may
manipulate language in order to gut most of the substance out of a coverage
provision but still leave some of it intact for events most unlikely to
happen-in semblance of protection still offered to the unwary insured.
The state of Arizona expressly rejected the reasonable expectations
doctrine because it was felt that a rule must be applied which recognized
more than just "fervent hope usually engendered by loss."' The court
made it very clear that it intended to uphold the supremacy of traditional
contracts law in the construction of insurance policies.'
Yet in both states, the restriction that the insurer should have reason to
believe the non-assent of the insured was not plainly addressed,"o and
401. Id. § 211(3).
402. See Rahdert, supra note 115, at 359-60 (explaining that the first two conditions most
likely will never occur in the insurance context and only the third condition will probably supply
the issue which the insured could litigate).
403. 419 P.2d at 175.
404. Rahdert, supra note 115, at 360.
405. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d at 682 ("The reasonable expectation
of both the public and the insured is that the insurer will duly perform its basic commitment:
to provide insurance.").
406. Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d at 388, 395
(Ariz. 1984).
407. "In our view, a better rationale is to be found by application of established principles of
contract law." Id. (emphasis added).
408. Henderson, supra note 16, at 848.
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subsequent case law appears to be in flux.' The three methods by which
an insured is likely to infer some knowledge of non-assent upon the insurer
under section 211 are extraordinary situations which are most unlikely to
happen in light of the sophistication of the insurer in the manipulation of
language. They are contingent upon a nebulous and yet untested requirement
that the insurer have reason to believe that the insured would not have
assented-which, if taken literally fails for all the same reasons indicated
earlier that section 1649 fails in solving the adhesion problem both doctrinal-
ly and procedurally.1
Both section 211 and the California Civil Code section 1649 are
unrealistic in their failure to address the realities of the adhesive nature of
insurance contracts. Both are founded upon and mandate a return to the
traditional notions of contract construction for insurance policies. Had there
been adequate protection for the expectations of the insured, the reasonable
expectations doctrine would never have developed. The rise of the
reasonable expectations doctrine was a revolt against the traditional contracts
view which did not provide and to this day still does not provide an adequate
deference to the realistic expectations that may arise out of a transaction
between two vastly unequal parties.
CONCLUSION
The Bank of the West decision appears to signal a lamentable departure
from the well-settled practice of protecting the insurance consumer's
reasonable expectations. For twenty-five years the reasonable expectations
doctrine provided a check on the unbridled power of the insurance industry.
The insurance contract remains an adhesion contract. It forces the individual
to accept "organizational hierarchies" rather than an agreed upon deal.4
In this scenario "bargaining ceases to be expected, or even appropriate,
consumer behavior."412 Consequently, canons of construction designed to
oracle the terms of mutual assent have no place in the insurance context andjudicially created interpretive rules were specifically developed to close this
doctrinal gap.
409. Professor Henderson sees some hybrid form of the reasonable expectations doctrine
evolving in Arizona and Iowa. Id. at 852. In fact, both states appear to be moving away from
strict Restatement (Second) § 211 applications. Id.
410. See supra Part III.C.1. Assume a consumer wishes to purchase a policy on the London
Market at Lloyd's. He would contact an American broker who, in turn, would contact a London
broker. The London broker would prepare a sheet specifying essential terms. The sheet would
then be posted, allowing thousands of entities to bid for interests in the contract. Once it is
completely underwritten, the London broker would send the policy, usually comprised of
multiple risk ISO forms to the American broker. There is no point in the transaction where the
promisor becomes aware that the insured would not assent to the contract due to any particular
policy term. See also Keeton, supra note 21, at 968 (recognizing that the insured receives the
policy (and has the opportunity to read it) after he is already bound by its terms).
411. Rakoff, supra note 26, at 1225.
412. Id.
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Gray's reasonable expectations doctrine, which was designed for the
adjudication of insurance contract disputes, recognized that the average
consumer would not read his policy, nor understand it even if he had read
it. Under Gray, mutual assent of the specific parties was replaced by the
implied assent of the reasonable ordinary consumer. What the ordinary
consumer would expect under like circumstances provided the template for
what the courts would order by way of insurance coverage.
The reasonable expectations doctrine had many positive features. First,
it acknowledged the practical problems involved in proving the subjective
intent of the economically powerful insurance industry. Second, it provided
a check upon the coercive economic power of the insurer by protecting the
objectively reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, regardless of
the outcome of a technical policy analysis. The Gray doctrine correspond-
ingly protected the insurer's interests by conditioning application of the rule
only to cases involving ambiguous contract language. Even then, coverage
would be limited to that which the ordinary consumer would reasonably
expect, regardless of the insured's actual subjective expectations.
Moreover, the reasonable expectations doctrine made coverage disputes
relatively facile and inexpensive. Under Gray, most cases could be resolved
by judicial review of the insurance policy and the underlying facts (usually
as pleaded in the underlying complaint). Minimal extrinsic evidence of
circumstances and negotiations was needed since the court was enforcing an
objective test.
Through Bank of the West, the California Supreme Court provided the
insurance industry with a valuable benefaction-protection of the insurance
industry's expectations at the expense of the ordinary consumer. Thejudicial
fiat of Bank of the West ignores the problem of the adhesion contract and the
settled law specifically developed to address such. Applying the traditional
canons of contract construction (embodied in the California Civil Code413)
to the insurance sphere will encourage insurers to use ambiguous language.
This inference derives from the fact that under section 1649, the insurer's
perception of the insured's understanding of the contract terms controls the
outcome of the litigation. Consequently, the insured's purported beliefs will
be incongruously derived from the ISO's position papers.
Bank of the West did not only relegate contra proferentem into a doctrine
of last resort, but distorted it by discarding the notion of per se strict
construction against the promisor for a weaker version conditioned upon
objectively reasonable expectations on the insured's part. This reflects the
court's adherence to a newly created rule which remains neither true to Gray
and its progeny nor to traditional contract canons.414 Under ordinary
contract interpretation theory, contra proferentem's strict contra-insurer
application was employed regardless of whether the non-drafting party had
413. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1635 et. seq (West 1985).
414. See discussion supra part III.B.3.
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reasonable expectations of coverage. Bank of the West perverted the rule
espoused by Gray and its progeny by adopting Gray's variation of contra
proferentem conditioned upon reasonable expectations but adding the
inapplicable section 1649 analytical step.
The insurance industry performs a quasi-political role in the manner in
which it controls the conduct of the parties with which it contracts, yet state
regulation of the industry is weak-a situation compounded by the presence
of the monolithic insurance lobby which wields its power over legislatures
throughout the nation. Because of all the advantages415 afforded the
insurance industry, courts used to employ their equitable powers through the
reasonable expectations doctrine to correct the fundamentally unjust situation.
Aristotle once wrote that equity applied,
[I]n a situation in which the law speaks universally, but if the case at issue
happens to fall outside the universal formula, it is correct to rectify the
shortcoming, in other words, the omission and mistake of the lawgiver due
to the generality of his statement.416
Indeed the universal contracts law failed to address the special situation
inherent in the adhesion transaction and equity provided the answer. When
courts lose sensitivity to circumstances beyond the physical form of the
contract and refuse to honor the reasonable expectations induced by
promises, it is as if we have made true what Professor Kessler intimated in
1956: "[R]easonable expectations created by promises [must] receive the
protection of the law or else we will suffer the fate of Montesquieu's
Troglodytes, who perished because they did not fulfill their promises."417
415. "[Insurers] are.. . seen as bound by an implicit social contract to make their product
available to those who need it. That and their sheer size are why insurers have long occupied
a position in America somewhere between that of a public utility and that of the "private
government . . . They are treated in law as even more special than banks . . ." American
Insurance: The Trick is to Stay Upright, THE ECONOMIST, October 27, 1990 at 5. The industry
is also exempt from federal antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act and thus can escape
the legal consequences of such "collusive practices" as collective rate making in exchange for
good faith dealings and availability of the service to the public. Id.
416. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHIcs 141-42 (Ostwald trans. 1962).
417. Kessler, supra note 59, at 629. The ancient Troglodites (or "Troglodytes") were a
mythical "brutish" tribe who were fabled to inhabit a portion of Arabia. CHARLE Louis,
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, LnrrEs PERSANES, IN PERSIAN AND CHINESE LETrERS: BEING THE
LETrREs PERSANES BY CHARLEs Louis, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU AND CITIZEN OF THE WORLD
BY OIVER GOLDSITH 25, 45 (Oliver H.G. Leigh, ed., John Davidson, trans., 1901). These
people "lacked all notions of justice and equity." Id. Because they favored only their own
selfish interests and abandoned the "general welfare," id. at 46, they "perished in their sins."
Id. at 48. Of the entire tribe of ancient Troglodites, only two righteous families survived. Id.
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